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The Devil in Recent American Law
L. Joe Dunman*
Abstract
Despite its secular aspirations, the American legal system is
permeated by Christian and other religious ideas. One of the
religious ideas that frequently appears in recent American law is
the devil—the unholy antithesis of all that is good in the world.
Called by many names, such as Satan, Lucifer, or the Antichrist,
the devil is no stranger to the United States court system.
The devil arises from the hot depths primarily in five
contexts: (1) as a source of injury to reputation in defamation
cases; (2) as a prejudicial invocation made during criminal trials
to secure conviction, harshen sentences, or discredit witnesses; (3)
as a symptom of mental illness or delusion severe enough to
qualify criminal defendants for insanity pleas and incapacitate
decedents in probate; (4) as a source of religious conflict between
inmates and their wardens; and, sometimes (5) as a party to
litigation.
This Article broadly surveys each of these five contexts,
exploring how courts have adjudicated recent disputes that
involve accusations or admissions of Satanism and associated
rituals. Readers will learn how American courts have dealt with
religious ideas that many people find distasteful, dangerous, or
downright abhorrent. So far, no grand unifying theme or theory
is evident, so hopefully this survey will be a springboard for
further, more focused research and argument as to how the
American legal system should handle disputes that implicate the
“archvillain of world culture.”

Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Morehead State University. I would
like to thank Professor Kelly Collinsworth for encouraging the completion of
this article and suggesting creative classroom applications for its content.
*
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Introduction
In 1944, the Supreme Court declared that, in the United
States, “Man’s relation to his God was made no concern of the
state.”1 The federal Constitution contains no mention of a
supreme, supernatural being and religious tests are verboten.2
American law “knows no heresy, and is committed to the support
of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.”3 However, even in
this secular legal tradition, Americans’ religious beliefs—
specifically Christian beliefs—are regularly a concern of judges,
juries, and appellate panels.4
Consider the devil. In both the Catholic and Protestant
Christian traditions, he is the evil and unholy opposite of the
ultimate and infinitely good God. He is a failed usurper who
defied the Holy Father then was banished from Heaven,
eventually becoming the king of Hell, where the sinful writhe in
torment for eternity.5 He is known by the names Lucifer and
Satan, and by the titles the Evil One, Prince of Darkness, “prince
of this world, the great dragon, the old serpent, the prince of the
devils, the prince of the power of the air . . . the Antichrist.”6 He
plays the cosmic role of “the temptor, the accuser, and the

1. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI. The only aspect of religion American courts are
qualified to assess, at least according to long-standing Supreme Court doctrine,
is the sincerity of the believer, not the veracity of the belief. See Nathan S.
Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1187–88
(2017).
3. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728
(1871)).
4. See generally CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, LITIGATING RELIGIONS: AN
ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COURTS, AND BELIEFS (2015); Stuart Banner, When
Christianity was Part of the Common Law, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 27 (1998); A.H.
Wintersteen, Christianity and the Common Law, 3 AM. L. REG. 273 (1890);
Sanja Zgonjanin, Quoting the Bible: the Use of Religious References in Judicial
Decision-Making, 9 CUNY L. REV. 31 (2005).
5. Isaiah 14:12-15 (King James) (“How art thou fallen from heaven, O
Lucifer, son of the morning! how art thou cut down to the ground, which didst
weaken the nations! For thou hast said in thine heart, I will ascend into
heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God . . . Yet thou shalt be
brought down to hell, to the sides of the pit.”).
6. PAUL CARUS, THE HISTORY OF THE DEVIL AND THE IDEA OF EVIL 166
(Lands End Press 1969). This Article will interchangeably refer to him as “the
devil” or “Satan” for the sake of simplicity.
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destroyer.”7 He is “the archvillain of world culture.”8
In the culture of American law, the devil appears often. His
dark unholiness arises from the hot depths primarily in five
contexts: (1) as a source of injury to reputation in defamation
cases; (2) as a prejudicial invocation made during criminal trials
to secure conviction, harshen sentences, or discredit witnesses;
(3) as a symptom of mental illness or delusion severe enough to
qualify criminal defendants for insanity pleas and incapacitate
decedents in probate; (4) as a source of religious conflict between
inmates and their wardens; and, sometimes (5) as a party to
litigation. This Article will broadly survey each of these five
contexts in turn.9
The Article begins by describing how accusations of devil
worship can spark claims for slander or libel, and also how
common law and constitutional principles of religious freedom
can close the courts to certain religious defamation plaintiffs.
Part II then explores a similar reputational injury in the context
7. Wendy Griswold, The Devil’s Techniques: Cultural Legitimation and
Social Change, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 668, 670 (1983).
8. T.J. WRAY & GREGORY MOBLEY, THE BIRTH OF SATAN: TRACING THE
DEVIL’S BIBLICAL ROOTS xiii (2005).
9. This Article will not be an exhaustive survey of every case in which the
devil is invoked since the founding of America, but will focus instead on key
historical and contemporary cases that are representative of the above five
contexts. Beyond the scope of this article are references to the devil in other
types of cases, such as in criminal appeals by members of the Chicago-based
street gang the Satan Disciples. See, e.g., People v. Roque, 2013 IL App (1st)
112578-U (2013); People v. Hernandez, 840 N.E. 2d 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
Or in intellectual property disputes, between artists (for whom the Devil is the
subject of their art) and alleged infringers. See, e.g., Porto v. Guirgis, 659 F.
Supp. 2d 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Michelle Castillo, The Satanic Temple Sues
Netflix for $150 Million for Using a Statue of a Demon God in ‘The Chilling
Adventures of Sabrina,’ CNBC.COM (Nov. 9, 2018, 11:35 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/the-satanic-temple-sues-netflix-warnerbros-for-150-million.html. Or in cases where people religiously object to
obtaining or disclosing Social Security numbers for fear they will carry the
“mark of the beast” or be corrupted by the Antichrist. See, e.g., McKay v.
Thompson, 226 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000); Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269
(9th Cir. 1984); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Or in
disputes between the government and companies with religious-sounding
names. See, e.g., United States v. Devil’s Hole, Inc., 747 F.2d 895 (3d Cir.
1984). Or in Establishment Clause challenges to school mascots. See, e.g.,
Kunselman v. W. Reserve Local Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 931, 933 (6th
Cir. 1995) (“No reasonable observer would believe that the use of the [Blue]
devil as a mascot is meant to . . . advocat[e] Satanism . . .”).

3
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of prejudicial bias against defendants; that is, accusations of
devilish doings in criminal trials. Subsequently, Part III will
explain how demonic delusions (admitted or otherwise) can
create questions of competence and capacity for defendants and
decedents alike. Part IV probes the mostly one-sided free
exercise battle between prison officials and incarcerated
Satanists. Finally, the discussion ends on a humorous note as
the devil and his minions become parties to lawsuits of varying
levels of frivolity.
The author’s ultimate goal is that this preliminary survey
will spark additional research into one or more of the above
contexts. The devil-related court rulings discussed, infra, raise
serious questions about church/state separation, religious bias
by judges and juries, and how American legal institutions
discriminate among faiths. This Article does not present any
grand, unifying theories about how the concept of the devil has
shaped American law, nor does this Article make any
prescriptive arguments about how courts should handle
Luciferian litigation.
If there is one recurring theme here, however, it is that
nearly all litigatory invocations of the devil create tangibly
negative legal outcomes, and not just because one party always
has to lose. In American law, accusations (and admissions) of
Satanic loyalty cause damage to reputations, create civil
liability, help to convict defendants, harshen sentences,
constrain religious exercise, and get claims dismissed. The
American legal system, ostensibly secular as it is, is not
insulated from the bad religious baggage that Satan carries.
I. The Defamatory Devil
An ungodly man diggeth up evil: and in his lips there
is as a burning fire. A froward man sowethstrife: and a
whisperer separateth chief friends.
– Proverbs 16:27-28
Defamation is the devil’s preeminent stalking ground in
American law. This is fitting, because the shared root of the
English words “devil” and “diabolic” is διάβολος, translated from
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the Greek as diabolos, an adjective that means slanderous.10
The Bible describes the devil as the father of lying.11 Satan
exists as a dishonest foil to the absolute honesty of God, and to
be in league with him is to be a bad, untrustworthy person, an
“enemy of all righteousness.”12 Thus, accusations of devil
worship, demonic servitude, or diabolical sympathy can
seriously injure a person’s reputation in any Christian
community, or worse, injure the person herself because death is
one of the Biblical punishments recommended for wizards,
witches, and other devilish devotees.13
Defamatory insinuations of Satanic association are well
documented in historical court records of England and its
American colonies. In 1623, Colchester Borough courts in Essex,
England heard claims arising from “the circulation of libel
showing the devil taking tobacco with various of the town’s
clergymen.”14 Thirty-two years later, in the court of Essex
County, Massachusetts, a man named Job Tyler was compelled
to publicly post a hand-written apology to his neighbor Thomas
Chandler for, in addition to making numerous other slanderous
utterances, “wishing the devil had him.”15
That same century, rampant accusations of devilish
dealings tore apart the “little theocracies” of colonial America
like Plymouth and Salem in Massachusetts.16 Dozens of people,
mostly women, were convicted and severely punished for

10. JAMES STRONG, DICTIONARIES OF HEBREW AND GREEK WORDS TAKEN
FROM STRONG’S EXHAUSTIVE CONCORDANCE 1228 (Christian Classic Reprints
2009) (1890).
11. John 8:44 (King James) (“Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts
of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not
in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he
speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.”).
12. Acts 13:10 (King James).
13. Leviticus 20:27 (“A man also or a woman that hath a familiar spirit,
or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to death; they shall stone them with
stones: their blood shall be upon them.”).
14. J.A. SHARPE, DEFAMATION AND SEXUAL SLANDER IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND: THE CHURCH COURTS AT YORK 5 (1980).
15. JULIET HAINES MOFFORD, “THE DEVIL MADE ME DO IT!” CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND 51 (2012).
16. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 26
(Modern Library ed. 2002) (cited for the description of colonial communities as
“little theocracies”).
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witchcraft.17 Though thirteen women were executed in Salem
alone, some colonial witchcraft suspects were ultimately cleared
of wrongdoing. Acquitted women—or, more often, the husbands
of acquitted women, outraged by meritless attacks on their
wives’ godliness—did not shrink into the shadows once the
criminal proceedings were complete. At least thirty-eight
common law slander claims, most seeking public retractions,
were brought between the mid-1600s to the early-1700s in New
England by women accused of witchcraft.18 When the accusers
were unable to prove the devil’s explicit presence in the lives of
the acquitted witches, they were held liable and forced to
apologize.19 Meanwhile, in Virginia beginning around 1650,
“slanders and scandals Cast upon Women under the notion of

17. Witches, after all, were people who, through various mysterious
rituals and pacts, had “formally given themselves over to the Devil,” and
received magical powers in exchange for their devoted service. JEFFREY
BURTON RUSSELL, MEPHISTOPHELES: THE DEVIL IN THE MODERN WORLD 28
(1986). In his influential book, Wonders of the Invisible World (1693),
Massachusetts minister Cotton Mather argued that witchcraft actually
triggers an elaborate legal process in which God grants the snitching Devil a
license to smite “ungodly people” who “give their Consents in witchcrafts
diabolically performed”: “The Divel is called in 1 Pet. 5.8 Your Adversary. Tis
a Law-term; and it notes, An Adversary at Law. The Divel cannot come at us,
except in some sence according to Law . . . The Divel First Goes up as an
Accuser against us [and] . . . charges us with manifold sins against the Lord
our God . . . If our Advocate in the Heavens do not now take off his Libels, the
Divel then with a Concession of God, Comes down, as a Destroyer upon us. . . .
But such a Permission from God, for the Divel to Come down, and Break in
upon mankind, oftentimes must be Accompanyed with a Commission from
some wretches of mankind it self.” COTTON MATHER, THE WONDERS OF THE
INVISIBLE WORLD: OBSERVATIONS AS WELL HISTORICAL AS THEOLOGICAL, UPON
THE NATURE, THE NUMBER, AND THE OPERATIONS OF THE DEVILS 10–11 (Reiner
Smolinski, ed. 1998) (1693) (emphasis in original).
18. RICHARD GODBEER, THE DEVIL’S DOMINION: MAGIC AND RELIGION IN
EARLY NEW ENGLAND 15 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1994). Some of the women
were repeat plaintiffs, having faced multiple false accusations of witchcraft.
For example, Jane Walford of Portsmouth, New Hampshire was awarded
damages for slander in both 1648 and 1669. CAROL F. KARLSEN, THE DEVIL IN
THE SHAPE OF A WOMAN, WITCHCRAFT IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 62 (First
Vintage Books Ed. 1989). Defamation suits brought by men to vindicate
women far outnumbered suits brought by women themselves, however,
perhaps because “an attack on the virtue of a single woman put no husband’s
reputation at stake,” and husbands had standing to pursue defamation
remedies under the doctrine of coverture. Donna J. Spindel, The Law of Words:
Verbal Abuse in North Carolina to 1730, 39 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 1, 33 (1995).
19. GODBEER, supra note 19, at 153–54.
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Witches” had created such a glut of defamation cases that local
courts began levying criminal fines (as steep as a thousand
pounds) against spreaders of infernal falsehoods.20
By the early 1780s, the witch trials in England and America
had petered out.21 The rational influence of the Enlightenment
had settled upon the Western world, and the Lockean idea of
separating the spiritual dealings of church from the material
workings of state was gaining popularity, especially in the
newly-formed United States.22 James Madison proposed a
division between state and religious matters in his original draft
of the First Amendment in 1789 and a variation of it was
eventually ratified two years later.23 In his popular 1794 book
The Age of Reason, Thomas Paine ravaged Christianity (and its
diabology) as a tool of theocratic tyranny that should be rejected
in favor of secular democracy.24 As president in 1802, Thomas
Jefferson wrote his famous Letter to the Danbury Baptists,
describing the dual Religion Clauses as “building a wall of
separation between Church & State.”25 Meanwhile, back in
England, “belief in the existence of the Devil had practically
vanished,” at least among the literate classes, by 1800.26
20. Richard Beale Davis, The Devil in Virginia in the Seventeenth
Century, 65 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 133, 143–44 (1957).
21. ROBERT W. THURSTON, WITCH, WICCE, MOTHER GOOSE: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE WITCH HUNTS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 79 (2001). By
comparison, King Louis XIV had already decriminalized witchcraft in France
a century earlier. JEFFREY BURTON RUSSELL, THE PRINCE OF DARKNESS:
RADICAL EVIL AND THE POWER OF GOOD IN HISTORY 189 (1988).
22. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 29 (2005).
23. How, exactly, Madison felt about secular government’s relationship
to religion is still hotly debated, both by scholars and by Supreme Court
justices. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, at 612–16, 622–26 (1992)
(Souter, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91–103 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Vincent Phillip Muñoz, James Madison’s Principle
of Religious Liberty, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 17–19 (2003) (summarizing the
scholarly and judicial debate).
24. Peter A. Schock, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: Blake’s Myth of
Satan and its Cultural Matrix, 60 ELH 441, 444–45 (1993).
25. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 709 (2005) (Stevens, J, dissenting).
Just as the debate about Madison’s views still rages, not all scholars and judges
agree with the Jeffersonian interpretation of the Religion Clauses. See id. at
693–94 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Original meaning” of the Establishment
Clause prohibits only “actual legal coercion,” and does not require strict
governmental neutrality of any sort) (internal quotations omitted).
26. Schock, supra note 25, at 441.

7

ARTICLE 9_DUNMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

936

PACE LAW REVIEW

8/23/2019 6:46 PM

Vol. 39.2

Serious belief in the devil’s dark presence in the daily affairs
of men had dissipated just as the newly-independent America
was beginning to develop its own civil and criminal legal systems
independent of England.27 However, conservative Christian
sects still held sway over most American communities
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. Though
allegations of fiendish frolic had largely disappeared from
criminal dockets, they had not vanished as a source of social
strife and civil litigation. People still accused each other of being
in league with the prince of darkness, and those accusations still
harmed reputations within religious congregations and in wider
communities.
Once witchcraft was no longer a crime, it became more
difficult to recover damages for Satan-related insults, depending
on how and where they were made. Speaking false claims of
criminality triggered the common law cause of action now known
as slander per se, but false claims of non-criminal deviance were
not usually actionable. For example, in Pennsylvania in 1806,
verbally calling someone “Devil,” or “prince of darkness,” or
“brazen faced Belzebub,” was not considered slander because
such language “import[ed] passion, but no crime or discredit” to
the average citizen.28
Such infernal name-calling was actionable, however, if it
threatened the livelihood or professional standing of certain
special members of the community, however, even if no actual
crime was alleged. For example, falsely accusing a clergyman of
being a “preacher of the devil” was actionable because “these
words if believed, must deprive him of that respect, veneration,
and confidence, without which he can expect no hearers as a

27. RUSSELL, supra note 18, at 77.
28. M’Millan v. Birch, 1 Binn. 178, 180 (Pa. 1806) (stating “[i]n order to
make words actionable, they either must contain an express imputation of
some crime liable to punishment, some capital offence or other infamous crime
or misdemeanor, or they must be spoken of one in an office of profit, which may
probably occasion the loss of his office, or of persons touching their respective
professions trades and business, and do or may probably tend to their damage”
(citing Onslow v. Horne, 3 Wils. 177 (1771)). This is the same standard as what
is now commonly known as “slander per se.” See 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel &
Slander § 357 (2019). The Pennsylvania Court in 1806 did not acknowledge
the availability of any alternative slander per quod claim, regardless of
whether the plaintiff alleged special damages.
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minister of the gospel.”29
Consistent with the English common law distinction
between written and spoken defamation, claims in American
courts for Luciferian libel were easier to prove than those for
Satanic slander.30 For example, in March 1819, Sherman
Converse, editor of the New Haven newspaper The Connecticut
Journal, published an accusation that Connecticut postmaster
and statesman Joshua Stow had openly promoted devil worship
while participating in the state’s constitutional convention. 31
Converse wrote in the Journal that Stow had had the audacity
to suggest “that government had no more right to provide by law
for the support of the worship of the Supreme Being, than for the
support of the worship of the devil.”32 According to Converse,
Stow was not making a rational case for secular democracy; he
was invoking the dark lord to challenge the authority of God.33
On appeal, Chief Judge Stephen Hosmer of the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors considered whether Converse’s
editorial could amount to actionable libel. The Court found that
it could, even though Stow was accused of no crime. Writing any
false accusation of devil worship was simply beyond the pale:
A sentiment so irreverent towards the
Creator and Governor of the world, and so
analogous to the modes of thinking, habitual to
unbelievers and profligate men, would disgrace
any person who was not a professed infidel.
Taking it for granted, as we are bound to do, on
the falsification of this charge, by the jury, that
the plaintiff in his tenets is a [C]hristian, the
29. M’Millan, 1 Binn at 184.
30. See Nelson v. Musgrave, 10 Mo. 648, 649 (1847) (explaining the
traditional difference between libel and slander as both common law torts and
criminal violations).
31. Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 325, 326–30 (1820).
32. Id. at 329. According to the trial testimony of defense witness Dr. Bela
Farnham, Stow had made that comment, or something close to it, while
arguing for a constitutional provision separating church and state, because
even though “it was the duty of all men to worship the Supreme Being,” the
“Government had no right to enforce this worship.” ROGER S. SKINNER, REPORT
OF THE CASE OF JOSHUA STOW VS. SHERMAN CONVERSE FOR A LIBEL 11 (1822).
33. SKINNER, supra note 33, at 11.

9
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injury accruing to him from the preceding
imputation must necessarily be great. If believed,
it can scarcely fail to deprive him of the esteem of
mankind, exclude him from intercourse with men
of piety and virtue, and render him odious and
detestable. The evidence of this need not be
laboured; it is intuitive; and every man, who has
a common share of intellect and reputation,
knows, that a charge against him of this
description, would awaken all his resentment,
and deprive him of peace until he had successfully
repelled it.34
After this appeal and a second trial, Stow eventually
prevailed against Converse. However, despite a fairly long road
to a remedy, Stow actually had it easy compared to others.
Converse was a newspaperman and his libelous insults had been
published to the Connecticut public at large. His false charge of
Satanism was not confined to any congregation, and thus the
courts were open to Stow’s claim.
The same philosophical, political, and constitutional
progress that had phased out the prosecution of witches and
similar heretics in American criminal courts raised serious
hurdles for civil litigants fighting false accusations of demonic
dealings levied at them in church. With legal matters of church
and state now at least theoretically separated, defamation
claims borne from congregational clashes created problems of
jurisdiction.
In the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court
declared that purely ecclesiastical disputes and adjudications
within churches were totally outside the authority of secular
state courts.35 In the Court’s view, secular courts could exercise
34. Stow, 3 Conn. at 342 (emphasis in original).
35. 80 U.S. 679, 728–29 (1871) (stating “[t]he right to organize voluntary
religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any
religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted
questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government
of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general
association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so
with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But
it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such
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no jurisdiction over matters which concerned “theological
controversy, church discipline . . . or the conformity of members
of the church to the standard of morals required of them.”36
Since Watson, this ecclesiastical abstention doctrine has
“been absorbed into constitutional law as orthodox
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause doctrine.”37 The nowincorporated First Amendment mandates the same hands-off
approach as the old common law doctrine, and thus all internal
church conflicts must be considered beyond the jurisdiction of
the secular courts if they involve any semblance of “religious
doctrine and practice.”38 This rule also applies to defamation
actions.39
It may not surprise you that church elders sometimes lob
accusations of devil worship or possession at parishioners they
find troublesome (usually for more worldly reasons).40 Because
religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to
the secular courts and have them reversed”). In Watson, the Court imposed
religious limits on state courts without reference to the Free Exercise or
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, which were not incorporated
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment until 1940 and 1947,
respectively. See Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise).
36. Watson, 80 U.S. at 733.
37. Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict
Injury”: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free
Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 329 (2009). This doctrine is also
sometimes called the “church autonomy doctrine,” as originally used by
Douglas Laycock. See Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
38. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); see also Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976). This same
principle undergirds the so-called “ministerial exception” to Title VII
discrimination suits, which arose in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals and
was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).
39. Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 499,
517–19 (2013); see also 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 117, at 420 (1995).
(“Defamation actions are precluded by the First Amendment when an
examination of the truth of the allegedly defamatory statements would require
an impermissible inquiry into church doctrine and discipline”).
40. Congregational conflict can often become so severe that it gains local
newsworthiness, and thus the risk of defamation increases. See Mike Stunson,
‘Notice of Trespass’: Critics Receive ‘Church Discipline’ Over Vote on Pastor
Staying, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.kentucky.co
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sincere, supernatural devil worship is statistically very rare, 41
the vast majority of accusations are probably false, and thus
most Satan-smeared church members could bring meritorious
defamation claims against their congregational accusers. But
that does not mean the courts are always willing to hear such
claims.
Consider the case of Gregory Howard. Beginning in 1991,
Howard and other members of the Covenant Apostolic Church
of Cincinnati, Ohio sought access to the congregation’s books
during a financial dispute with church officials.42 After the
elders refused to turn over the records, the dispute devolved into
litigation.43 Three years later, once that lawsuit had finally been
resolved, the Church retaliated, dismissing Howard as a
member.44
Howard sued the Church again, this time for defamation.
He alleged that church officials had justified his
excommunication by concocting fiendish transgressions: “that he
was in league with Satan, that he had been overtaken by a fall,
that he was a defiler of the temple and an enemy of the
Church . . . .”45 The way Howard saw it, these were slanderous
insults tied to a secular dispute over money that had nothing to
do with religious doctrine.
The Ohio Court of Appeals, citing Watson, disagreed. The
decision to dismiss Howard as a member, the Court said, was a
matter of church discipline.46 Even though Howard’s problems
m/news/state/article196901624.html.
41. For example, only 1525 people self-identified their religion as
“Satanism” on the 2001 British Census, a tiny fraction of the total population
of over 50 million. More than 37 million people self-identified as Christian.
Jonathan Petre, Spiritual Britain Worships Over 170 Different Faiths,
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 13, 2004, 12:01 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne
ws/1478870/Spiritual-Britain-worships-over-170-different-faiths.html.
Considering the predominance of secular or “rationalist” versions of Satanism
compared to theistic ones, it would probably be misleading to describe most of
the respondents to the British Census as “sincere devil worshippers.” A SBJØRN
DYRENDAL ET AL., THE INVENTION OF SATANISM 3–7 (2016).
42. Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 385, 386
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 388.
46. Id.
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with the Church were sparked by his criticism of its financial
dealings, not its religious doctrine,47 the Court concluded that
the Church’s discourteous statements were “inextricably
intertwined with ecclesiastical or religious issues over which
secular courts have no jurisdiction.”48 The lower court’s
dismissal of Howard’s defamation claim was affirmed, and he
was left with no legal remedy.
Contrast Gregory Howard’s case to that of Jane
Kliebenstein. Kliebenstein was a member of Shell Rock United
Methodist Church in tiny Shell Rock, Iowa.49 After receiving
reports of conflict within the congregation, UMC supervising
minister Jerrold Swinton visited the Church, where he
discovered that Ms. Kliebenstein was a source of regular discord.
Swinton then sent a letter, not only to members of the Church
but also to nonmembers living in the local community,
recommending that the congregation should eliminate the
“spirit of Satan” working “in their midst” by stripping an
unnamed troublemaker of her church offices, and perhaps
ending her membership altogether if necessary.50
Kliebenstein then sued for libel, arguing that she was the
obvious subject of the phrase “spirit of Satan,” which falsely
impugned her good moral character and wounded her reputation
in the tight-knit community beyond the walls of the church.51
Swinton and other church officials conceded in the lower court
that Kliebenstein was in fact the subject of the “spirit of Satan”
reference, but argued that the phrase was a “purely
ecclesiastical term, deriving its meaning from religious dogma,”
and was therefore outside the jurisdiction of the state courts. 52
The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment.
The Supreme Court of Iowa did not agree, however, that this
was a purely religious matter. First, the letter had been sent to
47. See Matthew 22:21 (King James) (“Render therefore unto Caesar the
things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s”).
48. Howard, 705 N.E.2d at 389.
49. Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 663
N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 2003). The 2000 U.S. Census listed Shell Rock’s population
as 1298.
50. Id. at 405.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 406.
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members of the community outside of the congregation.53
Second, because Swinton’s letter was published partially to a
non-church audience, the dispositive question became whether
“spirit of Satan” could have a secular meaning sufficient to hurt
Kliebenstein’s wider reputation.54 Relying on four dictionary
definitions, the Court concluded that “spirit of Satan” obviously
had religious roots, but the phrase also carried “a common, and
largely unflattering secular meaning” suggesting an impulse or
tendency toward “innate wickedness.”55 The letter thus created
sufficient grounds for a defamation claim, and the Iowa Supreme
Court reversed summary judgment to allow Kliebenstein’s case
to proceed.56
Insinuations of infernal collusion do not always implicate
sensitive questions of church/state separation, however. Like
the 1819 case of Converse v. Stow57 discussed previously within
this Section, modern day devil-based defamation sometimes
takes place outside of churches altogether, and thus litigation
may proceed free from the First Amendment. Take, for example,
the truly bizarre and protracted battle between two corporate
behemoths: Procter & Gamble (P&G) and Amway.
In the early 1980s, rumors began to circulate among the
public that P&G was in league with Satan.58 While the true
origins of the rumors are unknown, some Amway distributors
helped to spread it.59 For several years Amway management
tried to suppress the rumors against its chief rival, but when the
53. Id. at 407 (“The fact that Swinton’s communication about Jane was
published outside the congregation weakens [the] ecclesiastical shield”).
54. Id.
55. Kliebenstein, 663 N.W.2d at 408.
56. See Chad Olsen, In the Twenty-First Century’s Marketplace of Ideas,
Will Religious Speech Continue to Be Welcome?: Religious Speech as Grounds
for Defamation, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 497 (2005).
57. 3 Conn. 325, 326–330 (1820).
58. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir.
2001).
59. Id. Amway has not always had a particularly secular internal culture.
After all, it was co-founded by conservative Christian activist Richard DeVos.
See Our Story, AMWAY, https://www.amwayglobal.com/out-story/ (last visited
Apr. 14, 2019); Ally Boghun, The DeVos Family: Promoting Conservative
Religious Values Through Political Donations, REWIRE (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://rewire.news/article/2016/03/21/devos-family-promoting-christianorthodoxy-political-donations/.
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accusations reemerged in 1995, the relationship between the
companies fully deteriorated.
In April of that year, Amway distributor, Randy Haugen,
internally circulated this account of P&G’s supposedly Satanic
dealings:
. . . [T]he president of Procter & Gamble
appeared on the Phil Donahue Show on March 1,
‘95.60 He announced that due to the openness of
our society, he was coming out of the closet about
his association with the church of satan. He stated
that a large portion of the profits from [P & G]
products go to support his satanic church. When
asked by Donahue if stating this on television
would hurt his business, his reply was, “There are
not enough Christians in the United States to
make a difference. . .”
. . . [I]f you are not sure about a product, look
for the symbol of the ram’s horn that will appear
on each product beginning in April. The ram’s
horn will form the 666 which is known as satan’s
number. I’ll tell you it really makes you count your
blessings to have available to all of us a business
that allows us to buy all the products that we want
from our own shelf and I guess my real question
is, if people aren’t being loyal to themselves and
buying from their own business, then whose
business are they supporting and who are they
buying from. Love you. Talk to you later. Bye.61

60. But see David Mikkelson, Procter & Gamble and Satanism Rumor,
SNOPES (June 21, 2013), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/trademark-of-thedevil/ (claiming that other versions of the rumor put the date of his appearance
on the show one year earlier; however, no P&G executive ever appeared on any
episode of the Phil Donahue Show).
61. Ty Tribble, Randy Haugen, Amway, Quixtar, Proctor & Gamble and
Satan, MLMBLOG (Mar. 21, 2007), https://mlmblog.net/site/randy_haugen_am/;
see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000).
Haugen’s message specifically listed forty-three P&G products by name which
would supposedly bear the ram’s horn symbol.
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The rumor then snowballed through the company:
Some Amway distributors printed fliers
containing the rumor, circulating them to
consumers, with a message saying, “We offer you
an alternative.” The fliers also gave contact
information for Amway distributors. Although
P&G has received complaints and inquiries about
this rumor for the last twenty years . . . the
number of complaints and inquiries increased
substantially in the states in which the majority
of Haugen’s distributors live.62
Despite several subsequent retraction attempts by Haugen,
the rumor continued to spread among Amway’s many clients. In
response, P&G filed federal lawsuits in both Utah and Texas
against Amway, Haugen, and other distributors, alleging that
the false Satanism rumor had damaged its reputation,
interfered with its business dealings, and cost it customers.63
P&G argued in both lawsuits that Amway’s promotion of the
rumor violated the Lanham Act.64 The Lanham Act, though
primarily concerned with trademark infringement, also protects
businesses from misrepresentations by competitors “in
commerce” regarding the “nature, characteristics, or quality” of
their “goods, services, or commercial activities.”65
It is
essentially a statutory ban on corporate defamation.66
62. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir.
2001).
63. Id. at 544–545.
64. See id; see also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519
(5th Cir. 2002); Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2018). Common law remedies for corporate
defamation and disparagement may also be available to some plaintiffs. See
generally Fred T. Magaziner, Corporate Defamation and Product
Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 963, 1008 (1975).
66. P&G also made a Utah state common law slander per se claim against
Amway which was dismissed by the District Court. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573, the appeals Court
noted that slander per se requires specific harm to a plaintiff’s trade or
profession, and the devil worship rumor was simply too general in its
disparagement: “Although offensive to many, an allegation of Devil worship,
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Amway countered that Haugen had only listed the names of
P&G products in his internal message and had not
misrepresented anything about their nature, characteristics, or
quality.67 The District Court agreed, and dismissed P&G’s
Lanham Act claims.
Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed:
The subject message linking P & G to
Beelzebub clearly concerned the “nature,
characteristics, [or] qualities . . . of . . . [P & G’s]
commercial activities,” under the plain meaning of
that phrase. In particular, the subject message
asserted that “a large portion of the profits from
[P & G] products go to support [the church of
Satan].” Given the common association of Satan
and immorality, a direct affiliation with the
church of Satan could certainly undermine a
corporation’s reputation and goodwill by
suggesting the corporation conducts its
commercial activities in an unethical or immoral
manner.68
Amway then argued that Haugen’s message to other
distributors was not actually “commercial speech,” and thus not
subject to the Lanham Act, which prohibits misrepresentations
“in commerce.”69 Relying on Supreme Court precedent defining
commercial speech under the First Amendment, the Tenth
Circuit ruled against Amway, concluding that the “theological
component” of the Satanism rumor was insufficient to strip it of
its commercial nature.70 The Lanham Act claim was allowed to

like drunkenness . . . does not pertain to a quality that is peculiarly valuable
in plaintiffs’ professional activities of manufacturing and selling household
consumer goods.” Haugen, 222 F.3d at 1277 (citing comments (c) and (e) to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573.
It appears the authors of the
Restatement used the facts and holding of McMillan v. Birch (discussed above)
to illustrate the Restatement’s slander per se standard).
67. Haugen, 222 F.3d at 1270.
68. Id. at 1272 (internal citiations omitted).
69. Id. at 1273.
70. Id. at 1275.
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move forward in Utah.71
Back in the District Court on remand, litigation of the
Lanham Act claims dragged on further for several years, until
2007, when a jury finally awarded $19.25 million to P&G for
Haguen’s and other distributors’ spread of the rumor.72 The
distributors appealed the verdict, but ultimately settled with
P&G in November 2008.73
While all of this was unfolding out west, Amway filed suit
in Michigan for tortious interference against P&G and its law
firm, as well as against a man named Sidney Schwartz.
Schwartz had posted a copy of P&G’s Texas complaint (along
with dozens of allegedly defamatory statements) on his web site,
which he named “Amway: The Untold Story.”74 P&G’s law firm
had retained Schwartz as a “non-testifying consultant” and
given him documents from P&G’s ongoing litigation against
Amway.75 Schwartz quickly settled, but Amway persisted
against P&G and its counsel.76 Unfortunately for Amway,
though, the federal District Court in Michigan dismissed the suit
71. The Fifth Circuit also remanded P&G’s Lanham Act Claim to the
District Court in Texas that had dismissed it, but on somewhat different
grounds. Rather than concluding, as the Tenth Circuit did, that Haugen’s
message to other distributors was definitely commercial speech, the Fifth
Circuit remanded for fact-finding on his motivation for sending it. If his
motivation was economic, the message would qualify as commercial speech and
the Lanham Act claim could proceed. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp.,
280 F.3d 519, 567 (5th Cir. 2002).
72. Associated Press, Procter & Gamble Awarded $19.25 Million in
Satanism Lawsuit, FOX NEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/03/20/proct
er-gamble-awarded-125-million-in-satanism-lawsuit.html (last updated Jan.
13, 2015). On remand, the Utah District Court had dismissed the Lanham Act
claims against Amway due a lack of vicarious liability, a ruling the Tenth
Circuit affirmed. See generally Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121
(10th Cir. 2003). The Fifth Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit’s lead, ruling
that res judicata precluded identical claims against Amway in Texas once the
Utah claims had been dismissed. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d at 496. The Tenth
Circuit reversed, however, a second attempt by the Utah District Court to
dismiss the Lanham Act claims against Haugen and the other distributors.
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 427 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005).
73. Matthew Heller, P&G Satan Rumors Case Settles After Epic Battle,
ONPOINT NEWS (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.onpointnews.com/NEWS/pagsatan-rumors-case-settles-after-epic-battle.html.
74. Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 346 F.3d 180, 181–182 (6th
Cir. 2003).
75. Id. at 182.
76. Id. at 181.
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based on the Michigan Fair Reporting Privilege.77
Affirming that dismissal, the Sixth Circuit colorfully
prefaced its account of the “long history of corporate warfare”
between P&G and Amway:
Recitation of the extensive and hate-filled
history between P&G and Amway would take a
writing as long as both the Old and New
Testaments and involve at least one of the Good
Book’s more prominent players. Although each
side would likely argue, if given the chance, that
its opponent was in the garden advising the
serpent when Eve took her first bite of the apple,
for our purposes we need only go back to the 1970s
and Satan’s rumored more recent activity with
and interest in soap products. For more than
twenty years, rumors of a relationship between
Lucifer and the soap manufacturer P & G-some
spread by Amway’s distributors-have circled the
globe, dogging P & G like a hound of hell . . .78
After explaining why Amway could not prevail on its claims
against P&G and its law firm, the Court pleaded with the
crusading combatants to call off their holy war, hoping that they
would “consider the impact of their continuing legal battle on the
scarce resources of the courts.”79
The battle between the two companies occurred during a
strange time in America. Many of the diabolic rumors swirling
against P&G coincided with a larger phenomenon: the so-called
“Satanic Panic” of the 1980s and early 1990s.80
77. Id. at 188. Under Michigan law, “[d]amages shall not be awarded in
a libel action for the publication or broadcast of a fair and true report of matters
of public record, a public and official proceeding, or of a governmental notice,
announcement, written or recorded report or record generally available to the
public . . . .” Mich. Comp Laws § 600.2911(3) (2018).
78. Amway Corp., 346 F.3d at 182.
79. Id. at 188.
80. “Satanic Panic is a term used to describe a phenomenon which occurs
with alarming regularity in areas with deeply rooted Christian traditions.
Various forms of Satanic Panic have been observed since the beginning of time,
and although the specific details may change with the times, the roots and
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In 1980, Canadian psychiatrist Lawrence Pazder published
a book called Michelle Remembers. The book told the story of a
patient who was ritualistically abused as a child by the “Church
of Satan” during the mid-1950s.81 These were the first public
charges of satanic ritual abuse in the United States and the book
ultimately triggered a wide-scale moral panic that lasted more
than a decade.82 The surrounding hysteria fueled several high
profile criminal cases, including the Kern County and McMartin
Pre-School child abuse trials in California and the West
Memphis Three murder trials in Arkansas. Ultimately, some
defendants were acquitted, and most of those convicted for devilrelated crimes had their convictions reversed as new evidence
emerged or old witnesses recanted.83 Some of the exonerated

results are the same as they have been throughout history. Satanic Panics
occur when superstitious people in power choose to explain events that are
difficult for them to comprehend by blaming demons and witches.” Dan
Stidham, Haley Fitzgerald & Jason Baldwin, Satanic Panic and Defending the
West Memphis Three: How Cultural Differences Can Play a Major Role in
Criminal Cases, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (2012).
81. MICHELLE SMITH & LAWRENCE PAZDER, MICHELLE REMEMBERS (1980).
82. DEBBIE NATHAN & MICHAEL SNEDEKER, SATAN’S SILENCE: RITUAL
ABUSE AND THE MAKING OF A MODERN AMERICAN WITCH HUNT 45 (2001); see also
Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 155–57 (2nd Cir. 2010) (summarizing the
relevant events of “the late-1980’s and early-1990’s, a period in which
allegations of outrageously bizarre and often ritualistic child abuse spread like
wildfire across the country . . .”); PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING
CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 166 (Yale Univ. Press
2004).
83. See Samuel R. Gross, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 539–40 n.40 (2005); Clyde Haberman,
The Trial that Unleashed Hysteria Over Child Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/us/the-trial-that-unleashedhysteria-over-child-abuse.html (regarding the McMartin and Wee Care
Nursery School cases); Maggie Jones, Who Was Abused?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Sept. 19, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/19/magazine/who-wasabused.html; Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in
Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/us
/20arkansas.html; 30 Years Later, Key Figures Reflect on McMartin Preschool
Case, CBS L.A. (Aug. 4, 2014), https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2014/08/04/30years-later-key-figures-reflect-on-mcmartin-child-abuse-case/0.
Not all of
those convicted have been released, however, including Frank Fuster,
convicted for ritualistic child abuse in 1984. Aja Romano, The History of
Satanic Panic in the US—and Why It’s Not Over Yet, Vᴏx (Oct. 30, 2016, 10:30
AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/10/30/13413864/satanic-panic-ritual-abusehistory-explained.
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later sued.84
Ironically, perhaps, Michelle Remembers may have also
triggered legal action from the unlikeliest of all devil-related
defamation plaintiffs. After publication of the book, Anton
LaVey, a self-styled Satanist and the founder of the real Church
of Satan, sued, or at least threatened to sue, Pazder for libel. 85
It is not clear whether he actually filed a complaint or not.
Author Mary de Young claims that Pazder retracted his
factually impossible allegations about the Church’s abusive
rituals (which allegedly occurred before the Church ever existed)
after LaVey merely threatened a lawsuit.86 However, the
Church of Satan itself claims LaVey did in fact file a complaint
in 1981, and in an affidavit LaVey disputed Pazder’s claim that
he was unaware of LaVey’s organization when Michelle
Remembers was published.87
Clearly, Satan is no stranger to American tort law.
Accusations of devil worship can lead to serious social penalties
for the accused (and thus great liability for the accusers). The
dark lord is no stranger to criminal law, either, even though
witch trials have long been a relic of the past. It makes sense—
if an allegation of antichrist allegiance can damage a person’s
social reputation, certainly the same could be used as a
84. For example, Jeffrey Modahl, convicted for molestation during the
Kern County panic of 1983, was granted habeas relief in 1999. He
subsequently sued the prosecutor and investigating officers in his case for civil
rights violations, but the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the dismissal of his
claims on immunity grounds. Modahl v. County of Kern, 61 Fed. Appx. 394
(9th Cir. 2003). John Stohl, whose conviction in the Kern County cases was
overturned, settled a civil rights suit against the county for $5 million. Kern
to Pay $5M Settlement to ‘Witch Hunt’ Man, BAKERSFIELDNOW.COM (Sept. 15,
2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20100807001433/http://www.bakersfieldno
w.com/news/59395087.html.
85. Truth being the ultimate defense to any defamation action, LaVey’s
self-claimed status as a Satanist would normally have disqualified him as a
devil-related defamation plaintiff. But LaVey’s Church of Satan was founded
in 1966, and thus could not possibly have been the source of ritualistic child
abuse in the 1950s.
86. MARY DE YOUNG, THE DAY CARE RITUAL ABUSE MORAL PANIC 23–24
(2004).
87.
Peggy Nadramia, From the Church of Satan Archives,
http://www.churchofsatan.com/from-the-cos-archives.php (last visited July 2,
2019). The author of this Article could not locate any corroborating court
documents to confirm whether LaVey actually filed suit, and if so, what the
ultimate outcome may have been.
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prosecutorial weapon against those accused of crimes. The next
Section explores how prosecutors have tried to turn their
community’s disapproval of the devil into a weapon against
criminal defendants.
II. The Prejudicial Devil
Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts
of your father ye will do. – John 8:44
Witchcraft may not be a crime in America anymore, but
devotion to the dark lord can still result in criminal sanction.
Just as accusations of Satanic collusion can damage a person’s
public reputation, so too can those accusations harm defendants
in criminal court. Despite the general ban on character and
unfairly prejudicial evidence, criminal courts sometimes allow
juries to consider a defendant’s devil worship.
It is a pillar of American criminal law that defendants
should not be convicted by unfairly prejudicial evidence, such as
character evidence that the defendant is simply a bad person
regardless of the specific bad acts for which he is accused. Long
before the Federal Rules of Evidence formally codified this
principle in 1975,88 most courts followed the common law rule
that “[t]he State may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the
law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even
though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by
propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime.”89 “The inquiry
is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary,
it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade
[sic] them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny
him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.” 90
Such evidence tends to be unfairly prejudicial because juries
may convict on an emotional basis, rather than on the weight of
the factual evidence alone.91
88. FED. R. EVID. 403, 404.
89. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948).
90. Id. at 475–76.
91. FED. R. EVID. 403 (advisory committee’s note to 2017 amendment).
However, that same evidence is admissible as, among other things, “proof of
motive.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b). For a thorough discussion of how criminal courts
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Similarly, the Supreme Court has long recognized a First
Amendment right to “join groups and associate with others
holding similar beliefs.”92 Evidence of membership in rebellious,
hateful, or anti-social groups should only be admitted as
evidence when directly relevant to the crime for which the
defendant is accused or was convicted.93 Defendants should only
be convicted for their criminal acts, not for their socially
distasteful beliefs or associations. Evidence of constitutionally
protected beliefs, such as religious beliefs, must be admitted for
some other purpose than to depict a defendant as “morally
reprehensible.”94
As the defamation claims discussed in Part I show,
American courts assume that most people will automatically
have a very negative emotional reaction to any alleged Satanist,
especially one accused of a crime.95 Accusing a defendant or a
witness of devil worship can be quite discrediting at trial.
Perhaps this is why prosecutors (and at least one defendant) in
criminal cases have tried to admit evidence of Satanic
sympathies against their opponents, though their success in
doing so has been mixed.96
Consider the following cases:
In the early 1980s, Joey Tate was convicted for shoplifting
in Iowa.97 A fellow customer had reported that he saw Tate come
out of a dressing room with a bulging vinyl bag.98 When the
salesman requested to look in the bag, Tate went back to the
dressing room, dropped two pairs of pants, and then ran out of
the store.99 He was later arrested. The bag was entered into
approach the evidentiary distinction between character and motive, see David
P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439
(2001).
92. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163 (1992).
93. Id. at 167 (holding that evidence that white defendant was a member
of the Aryan Brotherhood was irrelevant for sentencing purposes because his
victim was also white).
94. Id.
95. See supra pt. I.
96. See generally George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility and
Prejudicial Effect of Evidence, in Criminal Prosecution, of Defendant’s
Involvement with Witchcraft, Satanism, or the Like, 18 A.L.R. 5th 804 (1994).
97. Iowa v. Tate, 341 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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evidence along with a book that Tate had been carrying inside
titled Satan is Alive and Well on Planet Earth.100
At trial, the investigating officer testified that he talked to
Tate about the book, which Tate said he liked and believed to be
truthful.101 Tate’s attorney did not object to the officer’s
testimony, but attempted to have Tate testify about the contents
of the book, which was actually a Christian author’s call to fight
against Satan’s power over society.102 However, the prosecutor
objected, arguing that the content of the book was irrelevant,
and the trial court sustained the objection.103 Tate was not
allowed to clarify the contents of the book during his testimony.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Iowa reversed Tate’s
conviction and remanded for a new trial. When prosecutors
produce unfavorable evidence, the Court said, defendants must
be allowed to explain or rebut it (assuming they do not
successfully object to its admission in the first place).104 This
was especially true for a book with such an ambiguous and
potentially prejudicial title:
The title of the book in question, which was
designed to attract the attention of a bookstore
browser, does not reveal whether the book
promotes or opposes satanic worship. Therefore,
when the police officer testified that defendant
liked and agreed with the book, the jury may very
well have concluded that defendant was a Satan
worshipper. This would obviously be highly
prejudicial to his case. If the defendant had been
given the opportunity to offer an explanation, any
misunderstanding or prejudice could have easily
been cleared up. The book in question was written
by a contemporary Christian author. It discusses
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Tate, 341 N.W.2d at 64.
104. Id. at 65. The Court did not address whether the book was validly
admissible in the first place because Tate’s attorney did not raise an objection
at trial. However, it is not a stretch to assume the appeals court would have
also reversed the District Court if it had not sustained such an objection.
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the author’s beliefs about the evidence of Satan’s
influence in society and the way in which it can be
eliminated. While the book is about satanism in
one sense, it certainly does not promote Satan
worship.105
The Iowa Court did not explain why a jury would “obviously”
be prejudiced against Tate if they concluded he was a Satan
worshipper. Was Tate’s jury composed entirely of Christians?
Was he prosecuted in a particularly religious jurisdiction? That
is unclear. The Court just assumed the prejudicial effect was so
obvious that it scolded the prosecutor:
The prejudice to the defendant should have
been obvious to the prosecutor in this case. We
question his decision to use the book at trial for
any purpose. Assuming, however, that the book
was relevant to connect the defendant with the
vinyl bag, its prejudicial effect could have been
eliminated or at least minimized by a simple
request for an admonition, agreed to by both sides,
from the court to the jury that the book did not
advocate satanic worship but was instead written
by a noted religious author. Had the prosecutor
used common sense and discretion in talking
about the book, additional time, effort, resources
and expense in this appeal and new trial would
have been conserved.106
In a somewhat similar case from Illinois, Peter Quiroz, a
member of the Satan Disciples street gang in Chicago, was on
trial for murder, robbery, and battery.107 During closing
arguments, the prosecutor twice referred to him as a “disciple of
Satan,” rather than as a Satan Disciple.108 On appeal, the
105. Id. at 64–65.
106. Id. at 65. It is probably fair to assume that the prejudice to the
defendant was obvious to the prosecutor, and that is precisely why prosecutor
produced the book and then objected to any effort to clarify its content.
107. People v. Quiroz, 628 N.E.2d 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
108. Id. at 548.
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Appellate Court of Illinois held those references to be “clearly
improper” because “it is obvious that the fact that defendant
admitted to belonging to the Satan Disciples street gang does
not lead to the reasonable inference . . . that defendant was ‘a
disciple of Satan’” and such references were made only to
inflame religious feeling.109
The Court observed that
prosecutorial comments “designed to stir religious feeling push
beyond the bounds of proper courtroom decorum.”110
Other courts have allowed prejudicial evidence of infernal
affiliation at the trial stage, however.111 In State v. Bartnick,
another Iowa criminal case, prosecutors produced a letter
allegedly signed by Michael Bartnick, on trial for double
murder.112 In place of Bartnick’s signature, however, appeared
the handwritten phrase “Satan’s Dog Soldiers” and the number
“666,” which matched a tattoo on his arm.113 The Court
acknowledged that the signature portion of the letter was
prejudicial, but held that its probative value outweighed any
prejudice because: (1) the letter was essentially a confession to
the crime, (2) Bartnick denied that he wrote it and thus made
the signature an issue, and (3) an expert witness testified that it
109. Id. at 549.
110. Id. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that the prosecutor’s
remarks did not constitute reversible error in Quiroz’s case because the verdict
would not have been different without them. Id. Contrast this ruling with
Mitchell v. State, 379 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1989) (conviction reversed and
remanded for new trial upon finding that prosecutor’s introduction of
defendant’s “devil worship,” without other evidence linking him to the crime,
improperly placed defendant’s character at issue).
111. See State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 884–85 (Tenn. 1998) (holding
questions to witness about defendant’s alleged Satanism was admissible
because it was relevant to “the defendant’s reputation in the community for
peacefulness and quietude”); Commonwealth v. Drew, 489 N.E.2d 1233, 1243
(Mass. 1986) (holding evidence of defendant’s “involvement in Satanism” and
the victim’s desire to leave defendant’s cult “were inextricably intertwined with
the description of events on the night of the killing” and thus admissible.);
Stephan v. State, 422 S.E.2d 25, 26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant’s affiliation
with Satanic cult was admissible because it became “relevant and material” to
motivation for assault of witness who had convinced former cult member to
leave.); Skinner v. State, 784 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding trial
counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to cross-examination of defendant
about devil worship, considering defendant repeatedly denied it and no other
evidence was produced).
112. 436 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
113. Id. at 648.
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was in his handwriting.114
Meanwhile, in Maine, Scott Waterhouse was accused of
strangling a twelve year-old girl and ritually defiling her
corpse.115 During his trial, prosecutors produced a tape-recorded
conversation between police officers and Waterhouse during
which he described his Satanic practices and beliefs.116 The
prosecution also produced passages from Anton LaVey’s The
Satanic Bible, which Waterhouse referenced during his
interrogation.117 Despite Waterhouse’s argument that such
evidence was unfairly prejudicial, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine ruled that Waterhouse’s references to specific passages
from The Satanic Bible were probative of motive, identity, and
intent, because the jury could interpret the passages to be
consistent with the heinous crime for which he was accused.118
Then there is the case of Daniel Naylor, convicted of killing
a young man named Wayne Lange. Naylor, Lange, and several
other young men and women had formed a “family” that lived
together at various locations in the Rochester, Minnesota area
in the late 1980s.119 Members of this family had become
interested in both witchcraft and Satanism, and some, including
both Naylor and Lange, started referring to themselves as
“warlocks.”120 Then, during a group road trip into the country
two days before Halloween in 1989, Naylor slashed Lange’s
throat with a boot knife, killing him.121 When Lange’s body was
found several hours later, he had suffered what appeared to be
numerous ritualistic wounds: three slashes across the neck and
a stab wound to the chest, along with various other cuts and

114. Id.; see also Skinner, 784 S.W.2d at 873 (holding the admission of a
letter written by defendant that included allegedly Satanic references
“Merciful Fate” and “Evil Slayer” was not prejudicial error).
115. State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864 (Me. 1986).
116. Id. at 864.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 864–65. The admitted passages included, “[d]eath to the
weakling, wealth to the strong,” “[c]ursed are the feeble, for they shall be
blotted out,” and “[a]re we not all predatory animals by instinct?” As discussed
below in pt. IV, passages from The Satanic Bible have also been cited to deny
religious free exercise to incarcerated Satanists.
119. State v. Naylor, 474 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Minn. 1991).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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punctures.122
At trial, the prosecution produced a variety of evidence of
Naylor’s involvement in witchcraft and Satanism: testimony
from co-defendants that Naylor referred to himself as a
“warlock” and “Satanic high priest,” photographs of books on
witchcraft and Satanism that Naylor and his co-defendants had
had access to, and twelve actual books on the same subjects. 123
One of the books, Satanism: Is Your Family Safe?, was an antiwitchcraft book with a message that “people with long-term
involvement in witchcraft are necessarily persons with ghastly
criminal records and that jurors ought to put such people
away.”124
On appeal, Naylor argued that admission of this book with
no limiting instruction to the jury was unfairly prejudicial to
him.125 The Supreme Court of Minnesota acknowledged that
admission of the book without limitation was “persuasion by
illegitimate means,” but concluded that it was harmless error by
the trial court because “the jury would have decided exactly the
same way” based on the vast amount of other, admissible
evidence against Naylor such as the testimony of his codefendants and the other books.126 Naylor’s conviction for firstdegree murder was affirmed.127
Finally, consider the case of Commonwealth v. Costal,
another example of a court allowing prosecutors to admit
122. Id. at 317.
123. Id. at 318.
124. Id. at 319.
125. Naylor, 474 N.W.2d at 319 (Naylor argued that the testimony of his
co-defendants, the photographs of the books, and the eleven other books
admitted against him were also unfairly prejudicial, but the court rejected
these arguments).
126. Id. at 320 (though not much consolation to Naylor, the court also
issued a warning: “[W]e caution prosecutors and trial court judges to be
especially meticulous in their review of books and documentary exhibits . . .
Prosecutors should avoid putting at risk the fairness of a trial in a serious
criminal matter by seeking the admission of such marginally relevant,
cumulative and inflammatory material”).
127. See Naylor Denies Killing, Satanic Ties, POST-BULLETIN (May 20,
1991), https://www.postbulletin.com/naylor-denies-killing-satanic-ties/article_
1a6ceb97-7152-5467-9952-6be8e67f53eb.html. Though he did not testify at
trial, Naylor gave an interview while in prison in which he denied killing
Wayne Lange and denied that he was a Satanist: “I was made out to look like
the Charles Manson of Minnesota,” he said. Id.
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prejudicial evidence of Satanic religious beliefs against criminal
defendants during the guilt phase of a trial.128 Frank Costal was
convicted of killing a woman and her four year-old daughter in
their home in July of 1978.129 At trial, prosecutors presented
evidence that Costal considered himself a “high priest of Satan”
and had regularly engaged in dark rituals, including the
murders themselves.130 An expert witness testified that various
items found in Costal’s home, including “books, posters, plastic
skulls and bats,” were Satanic paraphernalia.131 The expert also
“testified to the prominent role of mind control in satanism and
the practice of causing others to commit crimes and perform
homosexual acts to further such control.”132
Costal argued on appeal that the admission of his alleged
Satanism was contrary to precedent banning the admission of
religious belief as evidence.133
The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had twice before ruled that testimony about
religion was irrelevant in criminal trials, and inadmissible
under a 1909 state law categorically banning the use of religious
belief “for the purpose of affecting [a defendant’s] competency or
credibility.”134 Nevertheless, the Court in Costal found no error.
The jury, after all, “was not compelled” to believe the expert
testimony about Satanism, and could instead choose to believe
that Costal was merely “play acting” and involved in Satanism
“as a joke.”135 Prejudicial as the evidence of his religious beliefs
may have been, it was not unfairly prejudicial, so the Court

128. Commonwealth v. Costal, 505 A.2d 337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
129. Id. at 337.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (testimony in the trial revealed that Costal had been having a
gay relationship with his victim’s husband prior to the murders).
133. Id. at 202–03.
134. Commonwealth v. Greenwood, 413 A.2d 655, 657 (Pa. 1980)
(questioning defendant’s membership in Universal Life Church was irrelevant
and contrary to the statute); Commonwealth v. Mimms, 385 A.2d 334, 336 (Pa.
1978) (questioning the defendant’s Muslim faith was irrelevant and contrary
to the statute).
135. Costal, 505 A.2d at 338. On the other hand, the Court also concluded
that the evidence of Costal’s Satanic beliefs was, “highly probative regarding
the manner of the slayings,” so it may have been disingenuous of the Court to
suggest that a jury could easily choose not to believe it. Id.
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affirmed his conviction.136
Though some courts are at least somewhat reluctant to
entertain diabolical insinuations during the guilt phase of a
trial, most are quite permissive after a guilty verdict has been
reached. During the penalty phase, prosecutors, seeking a
tougher sentence, generally get far more leeway to admit
evidence of a convicted defendant’s pro-Satan sentiments.
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the U.S. Supreme Court declared
that “a defendant’s abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most
people, may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing
judge” without violating the First Amendment.137 However, the
Court also qualified this strict statement by noting that there is
no “per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one’s
beliefs or associations” during the sentencing phase as long as
such evidence is “related to” the crime or “relevant to several
aggravating factors.”138 Evidence of bad character is considered
relevant.139 In practice, this qualification has allowed trial
courts to routinely admit evidence of Satanic belief and
association at the sentencing stage, and appellate courts
routinely affirm those admissions.
In People v. Kipp, the Supreme Court of California rejected
murder convict Martin Kipp’s argument that admission of a
letter and his own testimony stating that he harbored Satanic
sympathies was reversible error.140 His stated beliefs about the
devil, according to the court, were inconsistent with his
simultaneous claims of remorse, and therefore fair game:
A favorable view of the biblical figure of Satan
is generally understood as a symbolic rejection of
the values of love and compassion, and as
indicating acceptance of the contrary values of
136. Id. at 339; see also Commonwealth v. Enders, 595 A.2d 600 (Pa.
1991) (explaining that physical evidence, such as skulls and occult books, were
seized from defendants who were convicted of false imprisonment in an alleged
Satanic ritual which was ruled not unfairly prejudicial).
137. 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993).
138. Id. at 486.
139. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).
140. See 33 P.3d 450, 474 (Cal. 2001) (noting that the trial court excluded
evidence of Kipp’s Satanic leanings during the guilt phase, but allowed it
during the penalty phase).
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hatred and violence, with a consequent rejection
of all moral restrictions on crimes such as murder
and rape. This abhorrent value system is
inconsistent with defendant’s claimed remorse
and shame for the murders of his two victims, and
thus evidence was properly admitted in rebuttal.
If defendant’s conception of Satan encompassed
qualities consistent with an attitude of remorse,
he was free to articulate them.141
Furthermore, the Court said, it was Kipp who had placed
his own good character at issue during the penalty phase of the
trial, so there was no error in admitting rebuttal evidence
showing he had vowed to “his savior, Satan” to commit
murder.142
In State v. Jones, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed
a cocaine possession sentence that was based, at least to some
extent, on the defendant’s past Satanic beliefs and his affiliation
with a gang called the Sonz of Satan.143 The Defendant argued
that any consideration of his religious affiliation violated the
First Amendment.144 The appellate court disagreed, because the
trial court “did not sentence Jones for his satanic religious
affiliation; rather, the court found that this affiliation led Jones
to criminal conduct.”145 There was, according to the court, a
“reliable nexus” between Jones’ admitted past Satanic beliefs
and the drug dealing for which he was convicted.146
In Delaware, Aryan Brotherhood member David Dawson
was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder and

141. Id. at 474–75 (supporting its position that Satanism is generally
understood as an “abhorrent value system” that accepts “hatred and violence”
or rejects “all moral restrictions on crimes such as murder and rape”) (citing
McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993, 995–96 (11th Cir. 1989)).
142. Id. at 474.
143. 603 N.W.2d 748 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. Perhaps a more reliable (and obvious) nexus could be found
between Jones’ crimes and his association with the members of the cocainedealing Sonz of Satan. After all, it was the gang, the Court noted, who actually
“taught him how to sell drugs.” Id.
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sentenced to death.147 During the penalty phase of his trial, the
Court admitted evidence that Dawson referred to himself as
“Abaddon,” a name he had tattooed on his stomach, and which
he told a witness meant “one of Satan’s disciples.”148 Dawson
argued that the use of the name against him during sentencing
violated his First Amendment rights.149 The Supreme Court of
Delaware rejected this argument, however. “The State did not
offer that evidence in order to improperly appeal to the jurors’
passions and prejudices concerning . . . religion,” the Court
explained.150 Instead, “[t]he context of the State’s evidence was
necessary to explain Dawson’s view of himself and how he
wanted to be viewed by others” and thus was relevant to his
character, something a jury may consider in a capital case.151
As these cases illustrate, prosecutors are often allowed to
admit evidence of devilish doings at the sentencing phase of a
criminal trial. However, it is not a total free-for-all; courts are
sometimes willing to pump the brakes (though it rarely changes
the ultimate outcome for the defendants).
Dale Flanagan and Randolph Moore were both convicted in
1985 for murdering Flanagan’s grandparents in order to collect
insurance proceeds and an inheritance.152 During the penalty
phase of their second trial (their prior convictions were reversed
due to prosecutorial misconduct), the State of Nevada presented
evidence that the two men were members of a Satanic cult and
had sworn that “Satan is my God” as part of an initiation
147. Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078 (Del. 1990).
148. Id. at 1085. According to the Hebrew Bible, Abaddon means
destruction, and was the name given to “the angel of the bottomless pit” in
Revelation 9:11 of the King James Version.
149. Id. at 1102.
150. Id. at 1103.
151. Id. (What is important to a jury when choosing the death penalty is
an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual
and the “circumstances of the crime”) (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
879 (1983)). The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately vacated and remanded
Dawson, but not because the Delaware court had allowed references to
“Abaddon.” Although the Court declared that the admission of constitutionally
protected beliefs, it must be for some other purpose than to attack a character.
The Court limited its discussion to Dawson’s affiliation with the Aryan
Brotherhood, and did not hold that the admission of his religious beliefs was
improper.
152. Flanagan v. State, 846 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Nev. 1993).
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ceremony.153 According to the state, “the cult activities were
relevant to provide the jury with a clearer understanding of the
[defendants’] characters.”154
The Nevada Supreme Court
rejected this argument, however, because prosecutors had not
presented any evidence that the cult actually required or
engaged in any violent acts, and thus the Defendants’ religious
practices were “not relevant to help prove any aggravating
circumstance.”155
In effect, the Court concluded, “the
prosecution invited the jury to try appellants for heresy.”156
Flanagan’s and Moore’s death sentences were vacated and their
cases were remanded for a third penalty hearing.157
Somewhat similarly, in United States v. Fell, the Second
Circuit considered whether it was appropriate, during the
sentencing phase of a capital case, to admit evidence of convicted
murderer Donald Fell’s “satanic interests,” his “666” tattoo, and
his wearing of a Slayer t-shirt.158 Prosecutors argued that this
evidence was relevant to establishing the motive behind the
multiple killings in the case and to proving the aggravating
factors necessary to justify a death sentence.159 “According to
the government,” the court noted, “a Satanist believes he ‘can
murder rape and rob at will without regard for the moral or legal
consequences,’” and the proffered evidence established Fell’s
153. Id. at 1057.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166).
156. Id. at 1058–59.
157. Id. at 1059. Unfortunately, for both Flanagan and Moore, their third
penalty hearing produced the same result as the first two—they were again
sentenced to death. The next year, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed their
convictions and sentences , even though the court concluded that the
prosecutors had violated Flanagan and Moore’s First Amendment rights by
referring to their religious beliefs during closing arguments during the of the
guilt phase of the second trial. The Court reasoned that such error during the
guilt phase was less problematic than at the sentencing phase and, applying
the harmless error standard, concluded that the remarks had no impact on the
ultimate outcome of the trial. See Flanagan v. State, 930 P.2d 691, 693, 700
(Nev. 1996).
158. 531 F.3d 197, 227–30 (2d Cir. 2008). Slayer is a Grammy awardwinning heavy metal band. See Metal Band Slayer Wins Grammy for AntiWar Song, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2007, 6:33 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-grammys-slayer/metal-band-slayer-wins-grammy-for-anti-war-song-idUS
N1130509420070212.
159. Fell, 531 F.3d at 230.
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identity as a Satanist.160 The evidence was not unfairly
prejudicial, the Court ruled, not because religious evidence is
generally acceptable, but because admission of Fell’s beliefs was
simply not necessary to prove the aggravating factors.161 After
all, the government had provided other “essentially
uncontested” evidence of Fell’s murderous brutality. 162
Admitting evidence of Fell’s religious sentiments thus did not
constitute plain error and his sentence could not be overturned
on those grounds.163 Unlike Flanagan and Moore, Fell did not
even win a temporary victory for religious freedom on his
journey to death row.164
Finally, we examine one case where a defendant, not a
prosecutor, tried to use infernal allegations to attack the
credibility of a hostile witness. If it is true, as courts have said
in defamation cases, that allegations of Satanism and devil
worship carry “a common, and largely unflattering secular
meaning” suggesting an impulse or tendency toward dishonesty
and “innate wickedness,”165 then such allegations would no
doubt be a powerful weapon against witnesses, for whom
credibility means so much.
However, the Federal Rules of Evidence put various limits
on how witness credibility—that is, trustworthiness—can be
impeached at trial.166 One of those limits, Rule 610, forecloses
any admission of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions to
attack or to bolster credibility.167 If accusations of Satanism and
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Fell would ultimately plead guilty to four charges in exchange for a
life sentence. See Lisa Rathke, Man Pleads Guilty in Vermont Slaying to Avoid
Death
Penalty,
PORTLAND
PRESS
HERALD
(Sept.
28,
2018),
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/09/28/man-pleads-guilty-in-vermontslaying-to-avoid-death-penalty/.
165. Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conference of the Methodist Church, 663
N.W.2d 404, 408 (Iowa 2003).
166. FED. R. EVID. 604.
167. FED. R. EVID. 610. (“Evidence of a witness’ religious beliefs or
opinions is not admissible to attack or support the witness’s credibility”).
Before Rule 604 was enacted in 1975, many states required witnesses to swear
an oath of religious belief to be considered competent to testify at all, while
other states permitted non-believers to testify but allowed their credibility to
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devilish dealings are “inextricably intertwined with
ecclesiastical or religious issues over which secular courts have
no jurisdiction,” as the Ohio Court of Appeals declared in
Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church,168 then evidentiary rules
like Rule 610 and the larger principle of fairness upon which
they are based should exclude such accusations as well.
However, that has not stopped litigants from at least trying to
impeach hostile witnesses this way.
In 1974, the Supreme Court of Nebraska considered the case
of State v. Zobel.169 Zobel was convicted on a misdemeanor drug
charge. The only witness against him at his trial was a
Nebraska State Patrol officer named Rick Houchin, who testified
that he had purchased a controlled substance from Zobel, a claim
which Zobel denied.170 As the only witness for the prosecution,
Houchin’s credibility was a critical issue in the trial. To attack
it, the defense came up with a clever strategy: “establish
Houchin’s status as a devotee of Satan.”171
Defense counsel tried to get Houchin to admit to being not
just a cop, but also a “Priest of Satan” who, as a prerequisite,
had to “foreswear allegiance to God and Christ and accept evil,
the embodiment of evil or Satan as omnipotent” and also
forswear “all that is good and truthful.”172 The defense asked
Houchin a series of questions, some of which were successfully
objected to, about whether he had “attempted to interest other
young people in Satanism and the worship of Satan” and
whether he had “ever said to any person that [he was] a Priest
of the Devil.”173 Only two questions along this line were allowed.
The defense asked whether Houchin had ever “made an oath
rejecting the power of God and Christ and accepting Satan as
omnipotent,” and whether he had ever told anyone else that he

be attacked on a religious basis. See, e.g., Paul W. Kaufman, Disbelieving
Nonbelievers: Atheism, Competence, and Credibility in the Turn of the Century
American Courtroom, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 395 (2003).
168. 705 N.E.2d 385, 386 (1997) (discussed at length in Section I above).
169. 222 N.W.2d 570 (Neb. 1974).
170. Id. at 571.
171. Id. at 572.
172. Id.
173. Id. (objection sustained).
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had done such a thing.174 Houchin said no to both questions.
On appeal, Zobel argued that his full line of questioning
should have been allowed, and that he should have been allowed
to produce impeaching testimony to prove Houchin’s Satanic
allegiance.175 The Supreme Court of Nebraska rejected these
arguments:
Of the questions asked, accepting at face
value the defendant’s offer of proof indicating that
Satanism entails the rejection of “all that is good
and truthful,” it is clear that only the two
questions which were answered and the one
immediately following had any direct relevance on
the point of how the witness’ claimed beliefs
affected his veracity.176
Zobel’s conviction was affirmed.177
These cases and others illustrate that the criminal courts,
despite a general limitation on the admission of religious
character evidence and the sanctity of constitutionally-protected
rights such as free exercise and association, sometimes do admit
evidence of demonic devotion to determine guilt and
punishment.178 This evidence is assessed for other purposes as
well; as Part III explains below, courts also entertain allegations
(and admissions) of devil worship and demonic delusion when
deciding questions of capacity and competence for both
defendants and the deceased.

174. Id.
175. Zobel, 222 N.W.2d 570.
176. Id. The Court rejected the impeachment argument because the law
in Nebraska states that “impeachment by specific acts which bear upon the
character trait of veracity is not permitted” as to “avoid pursuit of collateral
issues,” and “[t]he witness’ alleged activities in the cult of Satan were clearly
collateral.” Id. at 572–73 (citing Boche v. State 122 N.W. 72 (Neb. 1909)).
177. Id. at 573.
178. Criminal cases are not the only place where this is an issue.
Nonconforming religious beliefs about Satan and his influence on daily life can
also be prejudicial in civil cases, such as in divorce hearings. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing custody
order due to unfair reliance on mother’s fundamentalist Christianity, including
strong belief in Satan’s power and influence, in award of custody to father).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9

36

ARTICLE 9_DUNMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

DEVIL IN RECENT AMERICAN LAW

8/23/2019 6:46 PM

965

III. The Incompetent Devil
But I fear, lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve
through his subtilty, so your minds should be corrupted from
the simplicity that is in Christ. – 2 Corinthians 11:3
Ever since the case of United States v. Ballard in 1944, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the only aspect of
religious belief American courts are allowed to adjudicate is the
sincerity of the believer.179 For example, under the First
Amendment and later statutes such as the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, if you can show sincerity, regardless of whether
or not your beliefs are accurate, plausible, or literally true, it can
be possible to avoid military deployment, dodge a fraud charge,
receive asylum, or escape a neutral obligation to provide health
insurance to your employees.180 But what happens if your
religious beliefs (especially beliefs about the devil) are a little too
sincere?
In American courts, sincere Satanic beliefs are used to prove
mental illness, insanity, delusion, or other forms of legallyrelevant incompetence. For example, a defendant may claim an
intense or literal belief in Satan to prove that they are
delusional, thus qualifying them for certain defenses or perhaps
even disqualifying them from standing trial entirely. 181
179. Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L.
REV. 1185, 1187–88 (2017). While Ballard is the first case to expressly
articulate that only sincerity, not “verity,” may be adjudicated, the general “noorthodoxy principle” of American law (as Chapman calls it) traces its origins to
the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones, discussed at length in Part I, above. Id. at
1197 (citing 80 U.S. 679 (1871)).
180. Id. at 1188; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682 (2014).
181. American courts define “delusion” in a variety of ways, and do so
“quite independent of the clinical or pathological views of the medical
profession.” J.E. Macy, Annotation, Insane Delusion as Invalidating a Will,
175 A.L.R. 882 § 3 (1948). For three representative examples, see In re Kaven’s
Estate, 272 N.W. 696, 698 (Mich. 1937) (stating “[a] person persistently
believing supposed facts which have no real existence, against all evidence and
probability, and conducting himself upon the assumption of their existence,
was so far as such facts are concerned, under an insane delusion”); Batson v.
Batson, 117 So. 10, 12 (Ala. 1928) (stating “the belief in a state of supposed
facts that do not exist, and which no rational person would believe, in the
absence of evidence, to exist, is an insane delusion”); Wigginton’s Ex’rs v.

37

ARTICLE 9_DUNMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

966

PACE LAW REVIEW

8/23/2019 6:46 PM

Vol. 39.2

Similarly, in will contests, strong evidence of “hyper-religious”
delusions can rebut the strong presumption of testamentary
capacity.182
We begin with criminal defendants.
In late October, 1985, Gregory Stevens and his wife left Ohio
on a road trip to Florida.183 After they crossed the border into
Georgia on I-75, they ran out of gas.184 At some point over the
next twenty-four hours, while their car was parked on the side
of the highway, Stevens beat and strangled his wife to death.185
At trial, Stevens pleaded the defense of insanity, based
primarily on a long history of mental illness and delusional
compulsions, as well as on his behavior immediately following
the murder.186 When he was apprehended by police in Georgia,
he told them that “his wife was possessed by Satan, that he had
beaten Satan out of her, and that she would arise the next day
at noon, rid of the devil.”187 After Stevens’ arrest, a courtordered psychiatric evaluation diagnosed him with manic
depression, delusional compulsion, and an inability to
distinguish right from wrong.188 According to a social worker at
the hospital where he was incarcerated before trial, Stevens was
“one of the sickest patients the hospital had had in a long
time.”189
Nevertheless, at trial, the jury rejected his insanity defense,
found him “guilty but mentally ill,” and sentenced him to life in
prison.190 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia
Wigginton, 239 S.W. 455, 459 (Ky. 1922) (stating “[a]n insane delusion . . . is
the spontaneous production of a diseased mind, leading to a belief in the
existence of something which either does not exist or does not exist in the
manner believed”).
182. However, as explained below, when it comes to the question of
mental capacity in will contests, sincere beliefs in devilish influence are
generally not enough reason for courts to toss aside the last wishes of testators
because American courts give great deference to the competence of the dead.
183. Stevens v. State, 350 S.E.2d 21, 21 (Ga. 1986).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 22.
187. Id. at 21.
188. Id. at 22.
189. Stevens, 350 S.E.2d at 22.
190. Id. at 21. Under Georgia law, a jury has five verdict options any
time a defendant claims insanity. They can find the defendant guilty, not
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acknowledged that “Georgia law presumes the sanity of an
accused,” but reversed the conviction, holding that Stevens
deserved a not guilty verdict due to the severity of his
delusions.191 Under Georgia law, a defendant should be found
not guilty if the defendant’s criminal act “was connected with [a]
delusion under which the defendant was laboring” and “the
delusion was as to a fact which, if true, would have justified the
act.”192 This was certainly the case for Stevens; the Court held:
The evidence was overwhelming that at the
time the defendant killed his wife he was
operating under the delusion that she was
possessed by satan and that he, the defendant,
was defending himself against satan’s physical
attacks and attempts to trap and destroy him, as
well as putting an end to the evil and destruction
in the world caused by satan. This evidence
demanded a finding that the defendant met the
justification criterion for a defense of delusional
compulsion.193
In other words, under the reasoning of Georgia law, if
Stevens’ delusions about Satan’s possession of his wife had been
true, he would have been justified in trying to beat the devil out
of her, and thus could not be held guilty of her murder.
More than twenty years later, a similar case arose in
Illinois. In 2005, a Chicago resident named Amir Kando
attacked and stabbed his neighbor Jason Burley.194 At trial,
Kando raised an insanity defense, but, like Stevens in Georgia,
guilty, “not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime,” “guilty but
mentally ill at the time of the crime,” or “guilty but with intellectual disability
at the time of the crime.” GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(b)(1) (2018).
191. Stevens, 350 S.E.2d at 22.
192. Id. at 22 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2018).
193. Id. at 22–23. In opposition to Steven’s insanity defense, Georgia
prosecutors pointed out that he had, at least arguably, taken steps to cover up
the crime, suggesting that he was not totally delusional. Stevens had wiped
the blood from windows of the car, removed his blood-covered shirt and
undershirt, and had, at some point, “ask[ed] about the death penalty in
Georgia.” Id. at 23.
194. People v. Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (Ill. App. 2009).
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a trial court found Kando guilty but mentally ill, and sentenced
him to fifteen years in prison.195
Kando had had a long history of mental illness and suffered
from religiously-themed delusions. In preparation for trial,
Kando was interviewed by two doctors, both of whom he told the
same general story: he had been receiving messages from Jesus
“that he should kill and lock up Satan for 1000 years,” so that
Satan “would not deceive the nations.”196 According to Kando,
his mind was constantly consumed by images of the devil and
his minions. Kando told one doctor that “I’m seeing Satan. All
Satanic people, Satanic workers, they’re all Demons.”197 These
delusions mostly focused on Kando’s neighbor, Jason Burley.
Kando told doctors and the police that Burley was in fact Satan,
because he “smelled like Satan” and “looked like Satan.” 198
When one day Burley allegedly told Kando that “Jesus was
black,” Kando said he considered this to be a provocation by the
devil himself and felt compelled by Jesus to attack his
neighbor.199
According to Kando’s family, his mental illness regularly
manifested itself as “hyper-religiosity,” in which he would
constantly pray, be “very preoccupied with religion and with
matters of God and Satan,” and experience “auditory and visual
hallucinations with religious themes.”200 During these “hyperreligious” episodes, Kando would become combative and
violent.201 The examining doctors confirmed the family’s claims
and concluded that Kando suffered from a severe psychosis in
which he could not tell right from wrong or appreciate the
criminality of his actions.202 Despite this evidence, the trial
judge concluded that Kando was capable of appreciating the
criminality of his actions and thus should be found guilty but
mentally ill.203
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9

Id.
Id. at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1174 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1184.
Id.
Id. at 1177–78, 1180.
Id. at 1188–89 (noting that the trial judge relied heavily on Kando’s
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On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed, holding
that the trial judge had improperly disregarded the testimony of
two expert doctors and four lay witnesses that had clearly
established that Kando was gripped by “hyper-religious
delusions” at all times relevant to his attack on his neighbor
Burley:204
[It] is undisputed in this case that the
incident for which defendant was charged was
conceived and took place in the grip of a psychotic
delusion. No one suggested an alternative motive
for defendant’s attack other than to eliminate
Satan pursuant to a commandment from God . . .
other than his delusion, namely that the victim
was Satan whom he was determined to kill or
incarcerate for 1,000 years. Accordingly
defendant’s ability to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct must be viewed from the perspective
of this delusion, that whatever he did was to
implement a divine command to attack the victim
whom he envisioned as a demon or Satan.205
It is not unreasonable to say that the intense sincerity of
Kando’s religious beliefs is what spared him from conviction for
attempted murder (though not from involuntary hospitalization
under Illinois law, pursuant to the appellate Court’s order of
remand).206 With his case and the Stevens case in mind, it may
be fair to ask whether American law carves religious exemptions
to criminal conviction if the sincerity of religious belief is so
behavior immediately following the attack on his neighbor, including
statements accusing his victim of being to blame for the attack, an effort to
hide the weapon, and the removal and hiding of his bloody clothing).
204. Id. at 1196–97.
205. Id. at 1190–91.
206. Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1202; see also United States v. Aleksov, 910 F.
Supp. 2d 230, 234, 236 (D.D.C. 2012) (describing that Defendant, who pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity to threatening the life of President George W.
Bush, was denied pretrial release from hospitalization because he only
complied with his medication requirement to secure release from confinement
and his “delusional system includes the belief that individuals, particularly
Satan, can control [his] thoughts and actions,” compelling him to act violently).
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intense that it becomes delusional.207 However, this raises an
interesting question beyond the scope of this Article: where is
the line between normative religious belief and delusional
“hyper-religiosity,” and how do courts find it, considering the
general principle that religious tests and veracity assessments
are forbidden?208
That question of procedure aside, the nebulous distinction
between religion and delusion arises in another legal context:
will contests. Courts frequently consider evidence that a
testator so intensely suffered from wild fantasies during their
life that they lacked the capacity necessary to leave a valid will.
When these fantasies are religious in nature, the courts must
decide whether they were intense (or, perhaps, sincere) enough
to render the deceased incapacitated. As discussed above,
similar evidence in criminal cases is thoroughly considered and
defendants may escape conviction because of it. In will contests,
however, probate courts generally ignore or wave aside all but
the strongest evidence of religious delusion.
In most American jurisdictions, the testator of a will “is
presumed to be sane and to have sufficient mental capacity to
make a valid will.”209 Thus the burden is on a will contestant to
207. Compare Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166, and, Stevens v. State, 350 S.E.2d
21, 21 (Ga. 1986), with State v. Hebert, No. 2010 KA 0305, 2011 WL 2119755,
at *1 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (convicting Defendant for the murder of her two
children after she failed to rebut presumption of sanity despite testimony that
Satan spoke to her and commanded her to kill), and Plough v. State, 725
S.W.2d 494, 500 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding the State successfully rebutted
the insanity claim because the Defendant’s actions after he shot his brother
were considered “methodical and calculating,” despite his belief that his
brother was Satan).
208. Remember that the Supreme Court has long held that the First
Amendment prohibits religious tests and trials, and no one can be compelled
to “answer . . . for the verity of his religious views.” United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). However, is that not what happened in the cases of
Kando and Stevens? In order to determine whether the Defendants presented
sufficient insanity defenses, the Courts in those cases had to assess their
religious beliefs and determined them to be so detached from reality as to be
delusional, even though both Defendants sincerely held them. Was it
appropriate for the court to assume that Stevens’ wife was not actually
possessed by Satan? Did the Court have authority to find Kando’s belief of
Satan on earth to be delusional? These were in effect religious tests. Under
what principle are such religious tests appropriate in the context of a criminal
prosecution but not in any other case?
209. 95 C.J.S. Wills § 20 (2018); see also 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 90 (2019);
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prove that the testator lacked capacity, otherwise the courts will
not invalidate a will. Most courts have a “strong preference to
find a testator competent,”210 and in some states, such as
Kentucky, the presumption of capacity is so strong that it “can
only be rebutted by the strongest showing of incapacity.”211
To show incapacity, will contestants sometimes argue that
testators suffered from delusions, including hyper-religious
beliefs in witches, demons, and the devil. Probate courts view
this as a questionable strategy, however, because such beliefs
have long been part of mainstream Christianity, the
predominant religious tradition in the United States, and
mainstream beliefs tend not to be viewed as evidence of insanity
or delusion.212 Accordingly, the general rule in most states since
the 1800s is that a will cannot be invalidated for lack of capacity
simply because a testator “was generally disturbed with a
strange belief in witches, devils, and evil spirits,” even if the
belief was literal.213 Only if someone becomes truly obsessed
with such ideas can a case of incapacity perhaps be made out.
A brief illustration of this rule can be found in Addington v.
Wilson, an Indiana will contest from 1854.214 The testator,
Francis Stephen, was “an ordinarily prudent, judicious
businessman” and “an average farmer” who quite sincerely
28 THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS V, CAUSES OF ACTION SECOND SERIES 99 § 32
(2005).
210. BOGGESS, supra note 209, at § 10.
211. Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998).
212. J.E. Macy, Annotation, Insane Delusions as Invalidating a Will, 175
A.L.R. 882 § 30 (1948) (“A mere belief in witchcraft cannot be taken as, in itself,
an insane delusion. . . . Absolute acceptance of the Bible as the Word of God
was deemed to require the belief . . .”); see also Scott v. Scott, 72 N.E. 708, 710
(Ill. 1904) (“An insane delusion is a belief in something impossible in the nature
of things,” not something that “a great majority of civilized human beings
believe” such as “the existence of a life beyond the grave”). Contrast the
deference given to religious belief in the context of will contests with the
interpretation of religious beliefs as delusional in criminal prosecutions, like
in the cases of Kando and Stevens, discussed above. Batson v. Batson, 117 So.
at 12–13.
213. Kelly v. Miller, 39 Miss. 17, 58 (1860) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Lee v. Lee, 15 S.C. L. 183, 4 McCord 183 (1827); McMasters v.
Blair, 29 Pa. 298 (1857)); see also Henderson v. Jackson, 111 N.W. 821, 823
(Iowa 1907) (“Nor is it sufficient to show that the testator’s imagination was
generally controlled by his belief in witches, devils, and evil spirits which
tormented him”).
214. See generally 5 Ind. 153 (Ind. 1854).
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believed that his late wife and surviving daughters were sinister
witches who “practised [sic] their infernal arts upon him.”215
Unsurprisingly, he left his daughters nothing upon his death.
The Court held that Stephen’s peculiar beliefs were no reason to
invalidate his stingy will. After all:
There might be cases where a belief in
witchcraft, as well as millerism, or the doctrine of
predestination, if permitted too constantly to
occupy the mind, might have the effect to obscure
its perceptions, destroy its balance in regard to the
ordinary transactions of life, make the believer, in
short, a monomaniac. But the evidence was not
such in this case as to make it clear that the jury
should have so returned their verdict.216
Thus, it is not a particular belief in witches or other
manifestations of devilish influence that can indicate incapacity,
unless the testator is obsessively fixated on such things to the
detriment of his or her other concerns.217 Under this generous
rule, courts rarely invalidate wills for eccentric religious beliefs.
There is, however, the case of “Crazy George” Caldwell of
Texas. The facts are complicated, but the short of it is this:
before he died, Caldwell left 160 acres of property in Anderson
County to three of his children, who then granted the property
to Gulf Oil and an investor.218 Two other children of Caldwell
contested the grant of property, arguing that Caldwell lacked
the capacity to execute a valid deed. Gulf Oil, in defense of the

215. Id. at 154.
216. Id. at 154.
217. See O’Dell v. Goff, 112 N.W. 736, 738 (Mich. 1907) (If someone thinks
“so continually and persistently upon [a] subject . . . as to become a
monomaniac, incapable of reasoning,” then “a will made in consequence of such
monomania is void for lack of testamentary capacity”); Wait v. Westfall, 68
N.E. 271, 276 (Ind. 1903) (stating “when associated with uncontradicted
proof . . . that the acts of the testator in the conduct of his business affairs, and
in his social and domestic relations, were uniformly intelligent, rational and
reasonable, proof of strange and unreasonable beliefs, and of wild and absurd
stories, standing alone, cannot be termed evidence of a want of testamentary
capacity”).
218. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walker, 288 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956).
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deed, produced a favorable will purported to be Caldwell’s, which
the deed challengers contested on the same grounds.219
At trial, the challengers of the deed and the will presented
extensive evidence that their late father, who was locally known
as “Crazy George,” suffered from insane delusions that
manifested as bizarre religious ideas. For example:
[H]e was unable to talk sense about cattle,
usually getting off the subject and beginning to
talk about the devil. He sometimes would create a
disturbance in his house and explain it by saying
he was having a fight with the devil. He believed
he died and had physically gone to both heaven
and hell, and while in these places he had talked
with the devil, imps, demons and angels; that
while in hell he had seen the devil making candy
out of plow points; that hell was black and heaven
was a pretty place; that while in hell he had heard
the devil playing a tune on a fiddle and that he
could sing this tune . . . that while in hell he had
seen the devil sawing up people with a circular
saw and throwing them into a lake of fire; he had
seen the devil’s horse, which was so big it had one
foot in St. Louis and the other in California.
George usually refused to cross any bridge and
sometimes gave the reason that there were devils
under them; he believed God was unable to kill
him for twenty years. George beat on stumps,
believing they were the devil’s home and that he
must drive the devil out by beating on them. He
shooed back demons away from fences when he
crossed them . . . . He believed he could converse
with the Lord, the devil and the saints; that he
could foretell the future.220
Based on this evidence and other testimony showing
Caldwell’s strained mental condition, the trial jury decided that
219. Id.
220. Id. at 179–80.
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Caldwell lacked capacity. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed, not simply because Caldwell had bizarre
beliefs sufficient to be considered delusional, but because he
suffered “from an unsound mind generally” which made him
“incapable of knowing and understanding the effects of his act
in making a will.”221 Acknowledging the permissive rule that no
delusion short of monomania could prove incapacity, the
appellate court held that the jury still had plenty of evidence to
support its verdict in favor of the challengers.222
So far, we have examined several aspects of American law
where Satanism carries a seriously negative connotation.
Accusations of devil worship can damage reputations and
impose liability, secure convictions, enhance sentences, and
rebut presumptions of competence. In Section IV, however, we
will consider how admissions of Satanism lead to negative
outcomes in a very specific legal venue: the prison. Satanism’s
bad reputation gives wardens and prison officials an excuse to
restrict inmates’ religious exercise, and the courts nearly always
allow it.
IV. The Incarcerated Devil
Wherein in time past ye walked according to the course
of this world, according to the prince of the power of the
air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of
disobedience. – Ephesians 2:2
For avowed Satanists in prison, two competing forces
collide. On one side, their constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion. On the other, Satanism’s bad reputation as
a religion of dishonesty, violence, and evil. This bad reputation
has force because prison officials routinely use it to justify
restrictions on Satanic inmates’ otherwise benign religious
practices, such as the acquisition and possession of holy books,
participation in group or individual prayer, and the observance
of holidays.

221. Id. at 180–81.
222. Id.
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Under the First Amendment, prison officials need a
legitimate penal interest to interfere with a prisoner’s right to
free exercise of religion.223 Under the Religious Land Use and
Incarcerated Persons Act (RLUIPA), prison officials may not
place a substantial burden on prisoners’ sincere religious
exercise without a narrow policy supported by a compelling
governmental interest.224 Order and safety, according to the
Supreme Court, qualify as both legitimate penal interests under
the First Amendment and as compelling government interests
under the RLUIPA.225 So, a prison official who can reasonably
articulate a sufficient interest in order and safety can curtail a
prisoner’s religious practice, and prison officials generally get
the benefit of the doubt.226
This doctrine creates a hurdle for incarcerated Satanists for
two reasons. First, “Satanism” has a very bad reputation as a
religion of evil and disorder. As discussed earlier in Part I,
mainstream Christian belief holds that to worship the devil is to
be an evil person, a perpetrator of dishonesty, a potentially
violent danger to others.227 Negative assumptions like this
predate the Colonial era witch trials and have been reaffirmed

223. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
“Interference” in most cases means the denial of a religious accommodation to
a prison rule or policy.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2018).
225. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (RLUIPA); Turner,
482 U.S. at 90 (First Amendment).
226. In First Amendment claims, the Supreme Court will not “substitute
[its] judgment on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration
for the determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running a
prison.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 353 (internal quotations omitted). In RLUIPA
claims, “courts should not blind themselves to the fact that the analysis is
conducted in the prison setting.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 866 (2015).
Nevertheless, even giving prison officials significant deference, the Court has
periodically ruled in favor of prisoners with minority religious practices. Id. at
859 (RLUIPA claim; Muslims); Cutter, 544 U.S. 709 (RLUIPA claim;
Asatruans, Wiccans, Church of Jesus Christ Christians, and Satanists); Cruz,
405 U.S. 319 (First Amendment claim; Buddhists).
227. This is, for what it is worth, not an accurate description of
predominant Satanist belief. According to Patrick Elkins, “Satanism is a
benign religion” and “does not teach hatred.” “Satanists obey the law.” Patrick
K.A. Elkins, The Devil You Know!: Should Prisoners Have the Right to Practice
Satanism?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 613, 642–44 (2004).
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in American pop culture as recently as the 1990s.228 Prison
officials embracing these stereotypes have refused to
accommodate the practice of Satanism among inmates. Second,
many inmates who profess to be Satanists are not very
sympathetic plaintiffs, often admitting to antisocial beliefs that
bolster the negative stereotypes of their religion.
Unsurprisingly, courts have mostly ruled against them.229
One unsympathetic prisoner was Charles McCorkle, an
Alabama inmate who sued prison officials when he was denied
access to two Satanic books and a medallion.230 The prison
defended itself first by denying that Satanism is a religion at all,
second by denying that McCorkle was a sincere believer even if
Satanism is a religion, and third by claiming that his practice of
Satanism posed a security threat to the prison.231 Why?
Because, as the prison put it, Satanism “teaches hatred for one’s
fellow man and disrespect for laws and legal order, and
encourages the practice of violent acts such as flesh-eating and
bloodletting.”232
In affirming the dismissal of his suit, the Eleventh Circuit,
per curiam, dodged the first two questions and turned instead to
the prison’s security concerns, which the Court believed were
justified based on McCorkle’s own testimony about his Satanic
beliefs. According to him, many of the rituals he sought to study
228. See related discussion in Section I. Sparked by a series of
sensational (and false) claims of ritualistic murder and cannibalism performed
by teenagers and adults, and bolstered by uncritical media reports, fears of
“Satanic Ritual Abuse” gripped the United States in the early 1990s. “At the
height of the scare, people were arrested, charged, and found guilty on what
hindsight reveals, and contemporary critical thinking revealed, as the flimsiest
of evidence.” DYRENDAL ET AL., supra note 42, at 106–07.
229. See, e.g., Miskam v. McAllister, Civil No. 2:08–02229 JMS, 2011 WL
1549339, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2011) (holding the prohibition of the comic
book “Satan’s Sodomy Baby” was not a violation of prisoner’s First Amendment
rights); Burton v. Frank, No. 03-C-0374-C, 2004 WL 1176171, at *1 (W.D. Wis.
May 20, 2004) (holding that prison ban of The Satanic Bible by Anton LaVey
was not a violation of inmate’s First Amendment rights).
230. McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993, 994 (11th Cir. 1989). According
to the court, the books were The Satanic Bible and The Satanic Book of Rituals.
The second book was likely misidentified, though. The actual title is The
Satanic Rituals. Both books were written by Anton LaVey, the founder of the
Church of Satan.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 996.
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in the book The Satanic Book of Rituals involved the sacrifice of
Christians,
“[w]rist-slashing,
blood-drinking,
and
the
consumption of human flesh—usually fingers.”233
Also,
according to McCorkle, the candles used in such rituals had to
be “made from the fat of unbaptized infants.”234 Bolstering his
claims, a fellow inmate testified that he had, on several
occasions, seen McCorkle performing blood-drawing and paperburning rituals on the prison grounds.235
If this was not scary enough, the Court then turned to the
contents of The Satanic Bible, “which,” the Court noted,
McCorkle “claim[ed] to wholeheartedly believe.”236 The Court
relied on testimony by the prison warden, “proclaimed (but
unnamed) Satanists,” and its own “independent review of the
book” to conclude that the book’s teachings “present a significant
threat to security and order within the prison.”237 The warden
testified that persons following the teachings of the book “would
murder, rape or rob at will without regard for the moral or legal
consequences.”238 Further, the Court paraphrased a portion of
the book as stating “that right and wrong have been inverted too
long,” and as challenging readers “to rebel against the laws of
man and God” and seek revenge against their enemies.239
The Court was convinced:
Clearly, practices such as those described
above, and the beliefs that encourage them,
cannot be tolerated in a prison environment since
they pose security threats and are directly
contrary to the goals of the institution. Allowing
the plaintiff access to the requested books and
medallion would only encourage such behavior.240
233. Id. at 995. The actual book, The Satanic Rituals, contains no such
rituals, and there is no indication in the court’s opinion that any other party
reviewed the contents of the book to confirm McCorkle’s account.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. McCorkle, 881 F.2d at 995.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 995–96. This is not quite a call to “murder, rape or rob at will,”
but is perhaps suggestive of such behavior when paraphrased this way.
240. Id. at 996.
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If it was any consolation to McCorkle, though, the Court also
recognized that he had been able to clandestinely practice his
own particular form of Satanism without the books and
medallion and thus the prison’s restrictions had not “foreclosed
all avenues of his worship of Satan.”241 The prison’s restrictions
were therefore considered reasonable partially because
“alternative means of exercising the asserted right remain[ed]
open.”242
Seven years later, in 1995, another federal court would
consider the penological implications of The Satanic Bible. This
time, a copy of it was denied to Ohio state prison inmate Robert
Carpenter.243 Like McCorkle, Carpenter claimed a violation of
his First Amendment right to free exercise, but unlike McCorkle,
Carpenter also alleged a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection.244 According to Carpenter, the prison
unfairly discriminated against him and other Satanists by
allowing inmates to possess copies of the Christian Holy Bible
and the Muslim Koran, but not allowing inmates to possess The
Satanic Bible.245
In their motion for summary judgment, prison officials
countered Carpenter’s claim with roughly the same defenses
used against McCorkle’s: Satanism is not a “religion,” but even
if it is, Carpenter’s ability to practice it had not been burdened,
and regardless of his beliefs, the prison system had “legitimate
penological reasons both for distinguishing between Satanism
and other religions and for barring The Satanic Bible from
Ohio’s prisons.”246
The District Court first considered whether Satanism
qualified as a “religion” for First Amendment purposes.247 To
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F. Supp. 522, 523 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 524.
247. Id. at 526–27. The District Court considered “three ‘useful indicia’
for determining the existence of a religion”: first, the address of “fundamental
and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters”;
second, a comprehensive belief system, rather than “isolated teaching”; and
finally “certain formal and external signs,” including “formal services,” a
clergy, and “structure and organization.” Id. (quoting Africa v. Pennsylvania,
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decide this question, the court relied on The Satanic Bible itself,
citing several passages which showed that Satanism “addresses
fundamental questions” (albeit “in an unconventional manner”),
has dogmas (“sort of”), refers to itself as a “religion,” celebrates
holidays, and has complex rituals (none of which involve violent
behavior as suggested by the court in McCorkle).248 Considering
all of this, the Court concluded that “Satanism appears to have
at least some of the indicia of a religion,” but it ultimately did
not matter because the Court was willing to “presume for the
sake of this motion only that Satanism is a religion the practice
of which is protected by the First Amendment.”249
With that inquiry out of the way, the Court then proceeded
to the real question in the case: was the prison justified in its
prohibition of The Satanic Bible?250 Initially, the prison system’s
Publication Screening Committee had recommended that the
book be allowed, but the director of the system overruled them
on the basis that the book—specifically its references to human
sacrifice—was “inflammatory” and thus in violation of prison
policy against religious practices that “threaten institutional
security.”251
The District Court agreed:
The Court ordinarily must defer to the
institution’s
decisions
regarding
the
appropriateness of policies and practices. Here, no
deference is necessary because the Court is in
complete agreement that large portions of The
Satanic Bible have great potential for fomenting
trouble of all kinds in a prison setting, leading to
difficulty in maintaining security and order and in
delivering rehabilitative services in the prisons.
662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981)).
248. Id. at 527–28.
249. Carpenter, 946 F. Supp. at 528 (emphasis in the original). It is
unclear from the opinion why the Court conducted such a thorough analysis of
The Satanic Bible at all if it was just going to presume Satanism was a religion
anyway.
250. Id. at 530 (stating “[t]his case is about a very narrow issue: whether
there are legitimate penological reasons for prohibiting plaintiff from
possessing The Satanic Bible”).
251. Id. at 529.
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In addition, much of the publication advocates
preying on the weak in any way possible for one’s
own
gratification—clearly
an
extremely
dangerous “teaching” in any setting, but
especially in a prison where the weak have fewer
avoidance strategies at their disposal.252
The Court then provided “a few examples of isolated
quotations” to illustrate its point, including passages that
encourage the hatred and smashing of enemies, “eye for eye,
tooth for tooth” retribution upon adversaries, indulgence in sin,
indulgence in “natural desires,” human sacrifice, ritual sexual
gratification, and “intense, calculated hatred and disdain.”253 In
the Court’s view, this content clearly justified the prison’s
prohibition of the book, and Carpenter’s First Amendment free
exercise rights had not been substantially burdened by the ban.
The District Court also dispatched Carpenter’s Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim on similar grounds; because
The Satanic Bible posed a unique danger of institutional
disruption and violence, the prison was justified in singling it
out for prohibition while allowing other holy books like the
Bible.254
The Satanic Bible is banned in the prison systems of many
states, and, almost unanimously, courts have rejected
challenges under both the First Amendment and the RLUIPA.
In addition to the rulings in McCorkle (Alabama) and Carpenter
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 531. One wonders why both the prison and the court
considered The Satanic Bible, based on the quoted passages, to pose a
penological threat sufficient to justify it being singled out from other religious
texts such as the Holy Bible, which, for example, contains its own fair share of
violence, references to sacrifice and cannibalism, prescriptions for revenge and
retribution, and descriptions of antisocial behavior. See generally JEROME F.
D. CREACH, VIOLENCE IN SCRIPTURE: INTERPRETATION: RESOURCES FOR THE USE
OF SCRIPTURE IN THE CHURCH (2013). As just one example out of a great many,
consider Deuteronomy 25:11-12, describing what should be done to a woman
who comes to the aid of her husband in a fight: “When men strive together one
with another, and the wife of the one draweth near for to deliver her husband
out of the hand of him that smiteth him, and putteth forth her hand, and taketh
him by the secrets: Then thou shalt cut off her hand, thine eye shall not pity
her.” Deuteronomy 25:11-12 (King James).
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(Ohio), federal courts have upheld bans of the book in Arizona,
Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 255
However, not all inmates of infernal inclination have lost in
court. The most notable win by a Satanic prisoner is that of
Robert Howard, who in 1994 was incarcerated at the Federal
Correctional Institute at Englewood in Littleton, Colorado. 256
Howard, unlike McCorkle and Carpenter, did not request
any particular religious items to keep for himself. Instead, he
requested “time, space, and implements” necessary to perform
three specific hour-long Satanic rituals, roughly one per
255. See, e.g., Goninan v. Holmes, No. 6:12–cv–01555–PK, 2014 WL
6966990, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2014); Ruley v. Stovall, Civil Action No. 10–CV–
142–KKC, 2012 WL 1038665, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 27, 2012) (holding that even
though confiscation of the book created a “substantial burden,” no violation of
RLUIPA); Johnson v. Williams, No. 3:07–cv–1659–HZ, 2011 WL 6778711, at
*1 (D. Or. Dec. 22, 2011) (“It goes without saying that the book . . . could
negatively impact prison staff and other inmates.”); Hendrickson v. Caruso,
No. 1:07-cv-304, 2008 WL 623788, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2008) (adopting
verbatim Carpenter’s negative position on the book); Winford v. Frank, No. 06C-1000, 2008 WL 359728, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (It was “undisputed”
that The Satanic Bible is “designed and used to cause harm to other people.”);
Burton v. Frank, No. 03-C-0374-C, 2004 WL 1176171, at *1 (W.D. Wis. May
20, 2004) (Ban of book and other items justified even though inmate had “no
other means of practicing Satanism.”); Doty v. Lewis, 995 F.Supp 1081 (D.
Arizona 1998) (holding that the book, “in the hands of Plaintiff presented a
serious threat to the safety and security of the prison.”); Jesse Bogan, Illinois
Inmate Says Rights Were Violated Over ‘Satanic Bible,’ ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, (Aug. 9, 2011), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/illinois/article_
d2bcf1f2-885b-5b26-8bab-4d75319e8314.html.
Also of note, the U.S.
Department of Justice has issued an opinion in support of Virginia’s ban on
The Satanic Bible in prisons. Letter of Finding from Michael Alton, Dir., Office
for Civil Rights for the Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs to Harold
Clarke, Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr. (Aug. 12, 2013), https://ojp.gov/about/ocr/pdfs/V
A-13-OCR-10.pdf.
256. Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1994). Only
one other case appears to have been decided in favor of a Satanic inmate. In
2006, the Southern District of Illinois ruled that a state prison had not justified
the confiscation of several books from an inmate, including The Satanic Bible
and The Satanic Rituals, considering the inmate had possessed them for
several months and they had previously been approved by the institutional
publication committee. Semla v. Snyder, No. 03-CV-00015-JPG, 2006 WL
1465558, at *1 (S.D. Ill. May 24, 2006). In a 2010 prison case, a magistrate
judge for the District of Montana recommended that the parties submit further
briefing on the question of whether a prison’s denial of an inmate’s request for
a copy of The Satanic Bible was justified under the First Amendment and
RLUIPA. Indreland v. Yellowstone Cty. Bd. Of Commr’s, 693 F.Supp.2d 1230,
1241-42 (D. Mont. 2010). No subsequent opinion of the court in this case is
available.
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month.257 For the time, he requested three hours in the
morning.258 For the space, Howard requested a very small
chamber (“even a broom closet will do”).259 For the implements,
Howard asked for “candles, candle holders, incense, a gong, a
black robe, a chalice, and a short wooden staff or other object
suitable for pointing.”260
In defense of his requests, Howard painted a significantly
different picture of Satanism than Charles McCorkle had.
According to Howard, his desired rituals, though avowedly
Satanic, allowed him “to release his anger” and made him less
violent.261 He also described his Satanic beliefs and practices,
contrary to the claims of the prison, as being “non-violent in
nature” and part of a “humanistic ethical system which would
never allow for violence, rape, human sacrifice, animal sacrifice,
[or] bloodletting.”262 Howard testified that Anton LaVey’s
writing, including The Satanic Bible and The Satanic Rituals,
was meant to be read symbolically, not literally.263
Nevertheless, the prison denied Howard’s request to
conduct his religious rituals. According to the prison, allowing
him or other Satanists to perform rituals “would pose a threat to
the good order and security of the institution.”264 The warden
testified that Howard’s various requested implements could
cause a fire, mask smells, cause audible disruptions, obscure his
identity, or be used as weapons.265 The warden also argued that
allowing Howard to openly practice Satanism would be
“inflammatory and . . . abhorrent to other inmates,” thus putting
his safety at risk.266

257. Howard, 864 F. Supp. 1019, 1021–22 (D. Colo. 1994). The rituals,
according to Howard, were “a compassionate ritual, a destruction ritual, and a
personal ritual.”
258. Id. at 1022.
259. Id.
260. Id. Howard would not keep the implements after the conclusion of
the rituals.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Howard, 864 F. Supp. at 1022.
264. Id. at 1021.
265. Id. at 1025.
266. Id. at 1025–26.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9

54

ARTICLE 9_DUNMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

DEVIL IN RECENT AMERICAN LAW

8/23/2019 6:46 PM

983

The District Court considered these arguments, and
acknowledged that they were legitimate concerns. However, the
Court noted, “[t]he problem is that many of the other religious
groups [in the prison] regularly use these very same—allegedly
very dangerous—implements,” and “[n]o security problems have
occurred.”267 As to Howard’s safety, the court brushed aside the
warden’s worry. Howard testified that he was already open
about his beliefs with other inmates, and, even though the court
felt the safety argument had “a certain amount of intuitive
appeal,” it was “not supported by one shred of evidence.”268
Next, the Court considered the cases of McCorkle and Childs
v. Duckworth, which both upheld prison restrictions on Satanic
practices.269 Both cases were easily distinguishable on their
facts, the Howard Court reasoned. McCorckle especially was
different, because the inmate’s professed Satanic beliefs in that
case were violent and dangerous.270 Howard’s beliefs were
peaceful and benign.271
Ultimately, the Court granted Howard’s requested
injunction, requiring the prison officials to stop denying his
requests to practice his religious rituals. It was clear to the
Court that the prison’s concerns, while legitimate in theory,
were unsupported by the evidence, and the prison officials had
inappropriately “focused on the tenets of the religion itself . . .
despite their professed concern for scarcity of resources and
security.”272
In this section we explored the negative impact Satanism
has on its adherents inside prison walls. With the exception of
Robert Howard and maybe a few others, admitting to Satanic
beliefs and seeking to exercise them freely can be quite a
267. Id. at 1025.
268. Id. at 1026.
269. Howard, 864 F. Supp. at 1026. In Childs,705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir.
1983), the Seventh Circuit upheld the rejection of an Indiana inmate’s various
requests for religious items such as a podium, candles and incense in his cell,
a crystal ball, and the use of the interlibrary loan system for use of books for
group study rather than individual use.
270. Howard, 864 F. Supp. at 1026.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1029 (carefully noting that the ruling did “not require prison
officials to accommodate every form of Satanism,” nor “require them to allow
each inmate to become a religion unto himself”).
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challenge for inmates in prison systems that consider it a
security threat and a court system that defers to the judgment
of the prisons.
In the final section, Part V, we shift gears to our final, and
somewhat lighter topic: what happens when the devil and his
alleged minions themselves become parties to litigation.
V. The Litigious Devil
But he turned, and said unto Peter, Get thee
behind me, Satan: thou art an offense unto me: for
thou savorest not the things that be of God, but
those that be of men. – Matthew 16:23
There is one more way the devil regularly appears in
contemporary American law: as a party to the proceedings, not
just as a nefarious defendant, but also sometimes also as a
remedy-seeking petitioner.273
As the “archvillain of world culture,” one might assume that
Satan would be the target of more than a few lawsuits, even
though, as the source of all evil in the world, he is probably
uninsurable. However, an inability to collect is not the only
problem facing would-be plaintiffs seeking damages from the
devil. Other problems are procedural.274
In 1971, Gerald Mayo sought leave from the Western
District of Pennsylvania to file, in forma pauperis, a complaint
against “Satan and his staff,” alleging that Satan had long
harassed and troubled him and “placed deliberate obstacles in
his path and caused [his] downfall.”275 These actions, Mayo
argued, deprived him of his rights under the U.S.
273. Though this Section mostly features inmates challenging their
incarceration, the nature of these particular claims does not fit under the same
penological theme of Part IV, and thus a separate section felt appropriate.
Also, as noted in the Introduction, outside the scope of this Article are
copyright and other intellectual property claims by artists or organizations for
whom Satan or other devilish imagery is the subject of their art.
274. For an entertaining guide to the nuts and bolts of suing Satan, see
Charles Yablon, Suing the Devil: A Guide for Practitioners, 86 VA. L. REV. 103,
103–15 (2000).
275. United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan & Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282, 283 (W.D.
Pa. 1971).
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Constitution.276 Denying Mayo’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis, the District Court questioned first the obvious
inability of the Plaintiff to “obtain personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in this judicial district.”277 The complaint, after all,
included no allegation that Satan even lived in Pennsylvania. 278
Mayo also failed to include the required form of instructions for
service of process to the U.S. Marshal.279 An unserved defendant
is no defendant at all, and thus Mayo’s claim could go no further.
Personal jurisdiction is not the only thing plaintiffs must
establish in order to sue the dark lord, however. They must also
state a claim for which relief may be granted.280 The same goes
if the defendants are merely Satan’s associates, rather than the
devil himself. This was the hurdle Tennessee inmate Alvin
Kennedy faced when he tried to sue the Church of Satan in
2008.281 This is what happened, according to the Court:
On December 27, 2007, the plaintiff sent a
letter to the Church of Satan in San Francisco,
California requesting information about the
church and Satanism. He also stated in the letter
that he “was very serious about becoming a
member of the Dark Side.”

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. Though, Pennsylvania does share a border with New Jersey,
which is rumored to be home to its own particular form of devil. See BRIAN
REGAL & FRANK ESPOSITO, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE JERSEY DEVIL: HOW
QUAKERS, HUCKSTERS, AND BENJAMIN FRANKLIN CREATED A MONSTER (2018). As
an aside, the Court in Mayo also noted that no official court reports include
any case where Satan has actually made an appearance in court, though “there
is an unofficial account of a trial in New Hampshire where this defendant filed
an action of mortgage foreclosure as plaintiff,” a winking nod to the plot of “The
Devil and Daniel Webster,” the 1936 short story by Stephen Vincent Benet.
Mayo, 54 F.R.D. at 283; see also STEPHEN VINCENT BENET, THE DEVIL AND
DANIEL WEBSTER (Penguin Classics 1999) (1936).
279. Mayo, 54 F.R.D. at 283.
280. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). For plaintiffs seeking
to proceed in forma pauperis, like Mayo, federal law says courts “shall” dismiss
their claims, sua sponte, for failing to state a viable cause of action. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2018).
281. Kennedy v. Church of Satan, No. 3 08 0225, 2008 WL 594065, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2008).
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Shortly thereafter, the Post Office returned
the letter to the plaintiff with a note from “Mr.
Satan” explaining that he was not approved to
worship the Dark Side. The plaintiff believes that
the defendant has violated his rights in some way
by failing to provide him with the requested
information and by not approving him for worship
of the Dark Side.282
Kennedy, proceeding pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983,
alleging that the Church of Satan, acting under the color of state
law, deprived him of his constitutional rights by rejecting his
request for information and membership.283 The Court, finding
no such action by the Church, summarily dismissed Kennedy’s
suit for failing to state a viable claim.284
Kennedy’s incarceration was incidental to his claim against
the Church of Satan. He did not sue the devil’s devotees for
locking him up. However, many other claims against the devil
appear in petitions for writs of habeas corpus, where prisoners
challenge the conditions of their detention. In cases like those
below, these litigious prisoners seek relief from far more sinister
forces than their earthly wardens.
In 2015, prison inmate Dommernick Brown filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the District of South Carolina.285 In
habeas challenges, the proper respondent is the warden of the
facility where the prisoner is being held,286 but Brown named a
few other notable parties, including “The Super-Rich Illuminate
(t-Worlders),” “The Anti-Christ (POPE Francis),” and “United
Nations and Their So-Called New World Order of satan.” 287
282. Id. at *1–2.
283. Id. at *2.
284. Id.
285. Brown v. Jett, No. 4:15-cv-01983-TLW, 2015 WL 11142468, at *1 (D.
S.C. June 17, 2015), vacated, 621 F. App’x 260 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
The full caption of the case lists Brown as “Dommernick Brown #11049-171,
United States of America, Suis Juris-Pro Se and Pro Se Coach-In Forma
Pauperis and Supporter of The-Second Coming of Jesus Christ Super-Star The
Messiah and Super-Star-and The Version of The New World Order #777
ALMIGHTY-GODs New World Order 777, Petitioner.”
286. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004).
287. Brown v. Jett, No. 4:15-1983-TLW-TER, 2015 WL 11120723, at *1
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Noting the warden rule, the Court dismissed the petition as to
all other respondents.288
Meanwhile, a civilly committed Minnesota man named Paul
Payen also filed a habeas petition in 2015, challenging his
ongoing involuntary hospitalization for mental illness. 289
Payen’s petition was similar to Brown’s in that he listed, along
with the warden of the hospital, several curiously-named
respondents, including “Aliens, (Demons and Devils and
U.F.O.’s) (Some Good and Some Evil),” “Prophet Ezekiel’s
Wheel,” “Reptoids and Reptillians of the Lower Fourth
Dimension,” and, more relevantly, the “New World Order of
Satan–# 666” and “Fall of Satanic–Same Sex Marriages.”290 The
District Court originally dismissed Payen’s entire petition for
want of a proper respondent, but on appeal the Eighth Circuit
reversed, finding that Payen had at least correctly named the
warden of his facility and had alleged facts sufficient for the
Court’s consideration, even though his petition was otherwise
“largely incoherent.”291
Unfortunately for Payen, remand
provided no relief, because his petition, still incoherent, was
ultimately dismissed on the merits as well.292
A third example of this genre is a habeas petition filed in
2016 by another South Carolina prison inmate, Julian
Rochester. Unlike Dommernick Brown and Paul Payen before
him, Mr. Rochester kept it simple. He named just one
respondent to his petition, “Head Warden B. McKie, Satan.” 293
However, the devil would once again escape accountability for
his infernal injustices. Over Rochester’s objections, the District
Court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation for
dismissal, the objections being no more than “rambling
nonsensical statements, various case citations, profanity, and

(D. S.C. May 29, 2015).
288. Id.
289. Payen v. Jett, 610 F. App’x. 594 (8th Cir. 2015).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 595.
292. Payen v. Jett, No. 15–122 (JRT/HB), 2016 WL 3149665, at *1 (D.
Minn. June 3, 2016).
293. Rochester v. McKie, No.: 6:15-cv-03258-RBH, 2016 WL 2756432, at
*1 (D. S.C. May 12, 2016).
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cartoon illustrations.”294
Our discussion of the litigious devil concludes with one very
unique petitioner, a man who may or may not actually be the
devil himself.
In 2012, a California state prison inmate filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the Central District of California.295 The
Petitioner was convicted in 2008 on misdemeanor and felony
charges of criminal threat, cultivating marijuana, and
“electronically contacting someone with the intent to annoy,
using profane language and threats to inflict injury on the other
person and his family.”296 Despite reversal of the latter
conviction and his incarceration having ended two years prior,
the Petitioner nevertheless challenged his incarceration on the
bases of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary guilty
plea.297
So who was this petitioner? His birth name was Edmond
Frank MacGillivray, Jr., but he legally changed it in 1988 to “I
am the Beast Six six six of the Lord of Hosts in Edmond Frank
MacGillivray, Jr. now” or “I am the Beast Sssotlohiefmjn” for
short.298
Mr. Sssotlohiefmjn first came under the scrutiny of law
enforcement in 2007 for sending a series of strange and
threatening messages, including an online comment to a news
article (signed “666BEAST666”) in which he claimed to be
“considering a killing spree” on the campus of Mt. San Jacinto
College where he would “off a bunch of preschoolers” at the
school’s daycare facility.299 The college went on lockdown, but
Sssotlohiefmjn never attempted any violent action.
Nevertheless, he admitted to making the threat and a

294. Id.
295. Sssotlohiefmjn v. Riverside Cty. Superior Court, No. EDCV 10–925–
GHK (AGR), 2012 WL 4791932, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012).
296. Id.
For the state Appellate Court ruling, see People v.
Sssotlohiefmjn, No. E047144, 2010 WL 219336, at *1 (Cal. App. Jan. 22, 2010).
297. Sssotlohiefmjn, 2012 WL 4791932, at *5.
298. I Am The Beast etc. v. Michigan State Police, No. 5:89:92, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS, at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 12, 1990). His previous name was Edmond
Frank MacGillivray, Jr. Sssotlohiefmjn, 2012 WL 4791932, at *1 n.1.
299. Sssotlohiefmjn, 2012 WL 4791932, at *2.
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subsequent search of his residence produced five marijuana
plants.300
His petition proved to be a rare win for the devil in the
federal courts. A federal magistrate judge recommended that
Mr. Sssotlohiefmjn’s petition for relief be granted on the first
ground (ineffective assistance of counsel), but not on the second
ground (involuntary guilty plea).
The magistrate also
recommended that his marijuana conviction be vacated, leaving
the misdemeanor criminal threat as the only conviction on his
record.301 The District Court agreed, and the Beast was no
longer a felon in the eyes of the law.
Conclusion
This Article surveyed five key legal contexts in which the
devil appears. Accusations of Satanism have long been a source
of civil liability in defamation claims. Courts sometimes allow
prosecutors to admit evidence of devil worship to convict and
sentence criminal defendants. Too-sincere beliefs in Lucifer can
support insanity defenses at trial or be grounds for invalidating
a will. Courts often affirm restrictions on the practice of
Satanism within prisons, and litigants sometimes list the dark
lord (or some other variant of his name) as a party to their
lawsuits.
Again, this Article offers no theory or prescription as to how
courts should handle Satanism in any of the above contexts, but
it does raise several important questions for future research and
argument. As just a few examples: are American courts
adhering to the Supreme Court’s ban on religious tests when
they assess evidence of Satanic belief? Do negative cultural
stereotypes about devil worship create bias in the courtroom?
And, are Satanists being left out of the recent legal and political
push for increased religious freedom?
These questions and others deserve serious consideration.
No matter how despised the devil may be in the Christian

300. Id. at *7.
301. Sssotlohiefmjn, 2012 WL 4791618, at *1. California does not appear
to have appealed this ruling or moved to retry Mr. Sssotlohiefmjn on the
marijuana charge.
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cultural tradition of the United States, the Constitution—and
long-standing Supreme Court doctrine—requires free exercise
for all and equal treatment under the law. Our courts and our
legal system should adhere to those principles even when
confronted with religious beliefs most people may still find
nefarious.
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